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ABSTRACT 
The Uighur issue is of vital regional and global security importance to China.  
Although minority separatists are not well armed and seem to be largely disorganized, the 
violence poses a very real threat to China’s ability to develop Xinjiang.   The Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP)’s behavior toward its Muslims has received renewed Western 
attention in the aftermath of 9/11.  China’s Uighurs have responded to CCP policies with 
violence and separatist activity, but the Hui (ethnic Chinese who are Muslim) have 
reacted with relatively high levels of accommodation.  Some have blamed Uighur 
separatism on external influences (such as transnational terror) and Islam.  However, the 
puzzle is, why do the Uighurs engage in separatism where the Hui do not?  This study 
contributes to existing literature by directly comparing the Uighurs and Hui in order to 
determine the reasons behind Uighur separatism and Hui accommodation.  This thesis 
argues that the Uighurs and Hui have faced different social and economic realities which 
have led to different perceptions of inequality and thus, different reactions to CCP policy.  
Also, unlike Uighur ethnic identity, Hui identity stems from and is compatible with the 
PRC and Chinese society.  This study uses primary sources including interviews with 






















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. CHINA’S MUSLIMS, HISTORICAL LEGACIES AND THE UIGHUR 
QUESTION ..................................................................................................................1 
A. INTRODUCTION............................................................................................1 
B. HISTORICAL LEGACIES ............................................................................2 
1. PRC Minority Policy Under Mao Zedong.........................................2 
2. PRC Minority Policy After Mao Zedong...........................................6 
3. The Uighur Civilization.....................................................................10 
4. Uighur Separatism in Recent Years.................................................12 
5. China’s Hui Minority ........................................................................14 
6. Hui Reactions to Chinese Minority Policy.......................................15 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW .............................................................................17 
1. Separatism Literature .......................................................................17 
2. Uighur Literature...............................................................................20 
3. Hui Literature ....................................................................................24 
D. METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES...........................................................27 
II. THE POLITICS OF MINORITY GRIEVANCES ................................................31 
A. INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................31 
B. HAN MIGRATION, INTERNAL COLONIALISM AND 
ASSIMILATION............................................................................................32 
C. UIGHUR PERCEPTIONS AND REACTIONS TO HAN 
MIGRATION .................................................................................................33 
D. INTERNAL COLONIALISM, RELIGIOUS POLICY, AND THE 
UIGHURS.......................................................................................................36 
E. HUI PERCEPTIONS AND REACTIONS TO HAN MIGRATION........39 
F. INTERNAL COLONIALISM, RELIGIOUS POLICY, AND THE 
HUI..................................................................................................................40 
G. CONCLUSIONS ............................................................................................42 
III. THE POLITICS OF MINORITY IDENTITY .......................................................45 
A. INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................45 
B. THE POLITICS OF IDENTITY..................................................................45 
C. MAPPING CONTEMPORARY HUI IDENTITY: PRIMORDIAL 
FACTORS ......................................................................................................47 
D.  MAPPING CONTEMPORARY UIGHUR IDENTITY: PRIMORDIAL 
FACTORS ......................................................................................................51 
E.   MAPPING CONTEMPORARY HUI IDENTITY: SECONDARY 
FACTORS ......................................................................................................56 
F.  MAPPING CONTEMPORARY UIGHUR IDENTITY: SECONDARY 
FACTORS ......................................................................................................58 
G.   CONCLUSIONS ............................................................................................59 




B. UIGHUR SEPARATISM: REALITIES......................................................61 
C. U.S. INTERESTS IN XINJIANG IN THE POST SEPTEMBER 11 
PERIOD..........................................................................................................66 
D. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES ..........68 
E. CONCLUSIONS ............................................................................................71 
LIST OF REFERENCES......................................................................................................73 



















I would like to recognize the following individuals for providing tireless, direct 
support of this thesis and for enduring my long-winded ramblings about China’s 
Muslims: Captain Leah Buckley, Captain Rich Carey, Major Chris Ford, Captain Tracy 
Glazer, Haning Hughes, Major Ivan Kanapathy, Captain Tom Moon, Dr. Maria Morgan, 
Nicole Norelli, Captain Andrea O’Connor, Dr. Shang Qianlong, and Kali Shelor.   
 
I am grateful to the United States Air Force Institute of National Security Studies 
for their material and financial support of the fieldwork conducted in support of this 
thesis.   
 
I would also like to thank my family for their tremendous support and 
understanding throughout this last year.   
 
Finally, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my advisors, Dr. Alice 
Lyman Miller and Dr. Tuong Vu, for the countless hours spent helping me through this 






























I. CHINA’S MUSLIMS, HISTORICAL LEGACIES AND THE 
UIGHUR QUESTION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
One of the most volatile and long-standing issues facing Beijing today is its 
relationship with its fifty-five ethnic minority groups.  The Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP)’s behavior toward its Muslims has received renewed Western attention in the 
aftermath of 9/11.  Though there are ten distinct Islamic minorities in China today, the 
two largest groups are the Uighurs and the Hui.  The Uighurs are a Turkic ethnic group 
and live primarily in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR).  Although the 
Chinese government officially granted Xinjiang autonomy in 1955, Beijing has since 
prevented Uighurs from asserting control over the XUAR, which has led to Uighur 
discontent.  This frustration has been manifested through violent bombings, 
assassinations, and other demonstrations.  The Hui minority also possesses an 
autonomous region (Ningxia), but Hui Chinese can be found in virtually every major 
Chinese city.  Unlike the Uighurs, the Hui have primarily pursued peaceful, cooperative 
strategies for coexistence with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).  The puzzle is, why 
do the Uighurs engage in separatism where the Hui do not?  More broadly, what are the 
prospects for ethnic peace in China?  What can the Uighurs and the Hui teach us about 
Beijing’s changing relationship with its ethnic minorities?   
This thesis addresses the above questions from political, economic, and social 
perspectives.  Both minorities and the reasons behind each group’s content or discontent 
will be explored.  This thesis argues the following: though Uighurs and Hui are both 
Muslim minorities, they have reacted to CCP rule in different ways.  First, the Uighurs 
have faced harsher social and economic realities than the Hui.  Different realities have led 
to different levels perceived inequality; this difference has produced increased levels of 
ethnic tension among Uighurs.  Second, Hui identity stems from and is compatible with 
the PRC and Chinese society.  Uighur identity exists independently from the PRC and 
has not been successfully integrated into contemporary Chinese society.  These 
differences in identity have made the Uighurs more predisposed to use violent separatism 
2 
than the Hui, as Uighurs do not rely on the PRC for ethnic identification.  Finally, this 
thesis will then assess the future prospects of Islamic violence in China, as well as policy 
recommendations for the United States. 
The Uighur issue is of vital regional and global security importance to China.  
Although minority separatists are not well armed and seem to be largely disorganized, the 
violence poses a very real threat to China’s ability to develop Xinjiang.   This resistance 
has also created a culture of fear in the region among Han and minority peoples alike.  
Beijing is currently able to assert effective control over its minority territories, but if this 
conflict of interest is not resolved, levels of violence could increase, leading to severe 
instability.  Moreover, the XUAR, Ningxia, and other minority regions are important to 
the regional security picture.  Uighurs and Hui share a common identity with not only 
similar ethnic groups in the region, but also with Islamic peoples worldwide.  Several 
Central Asian countries such as Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are also home to Uighurs, so 
an ethnic conflict could have severe regional consequences.  As China’s ties to the 
Middle East continue to grow, Beijing’s relationship with each of its Muslim minorities 
will increase in importance.  Thus, failure to resolve the Uighur issue might result in the 
intervention of other regional players or retaliatory policies.  Therefore, from a global, 
regional, and national security point of view, China must find a way to reconcile its 
minority problem.  An increase in violence would have long-lasting, negative 
consequences for Chinese national security and regional/global stability. 
B. HISTORICAL LEGACIES 
1. PRC Minority Policy Under Mao Zedong 
Before examining the current status of Chinese Muslims, it is first useful to 
review the ways in which CCP-minority relations have evolved.  The next sections will 
review the history of CCP-minority relations under Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, and 
Jiang Zemin, respectively.  In general, CCP-minority relations have been in a constant 
state of flux, from accommodation to intolerance, throughout the last five decades.  This 
changing relationship has been driven by the Party’s shifting perception of minorities as a 
threat to domestic security and stability.  In short, when the CCP has perceived minorities 
to be a direct threat to stability, relations between the Party and minorities have been 
relatively poor.  However, as perceptions have shifted and the Party has not perceived a 
3 
major threat to domestic security by minorities, relations have been characterized by 
mutual accommodation.  
 According to official figures, the CCP recognizes 56 different ethnic groups in 
China, but this has not always been the case.  After Mao Zedong and the CCP established 
the People’s Republic of China in 1949, immediate efforts were made to consolidate the 
Party’s rule over not only China proper, but also its frontier regions (including Tibet and 
Xinjiang).  In addition to military forces sent to occupy these borderlands, the CCP 
dispatched teams of anthropologists, sociologists, and demographers to collect census 
data and recognize ethnicities that sought to be known as official minority groups.1  
These researchers, relying heavily on Soviet assistance and advisers, used Joseph Stalin’s 
“Four Commons”2 to create 41 distinct ethnicities (minzu) in the 1953 census, of the 400 
ethnic groups that applied.3  Of course, this process was controversial, as it is unclear 
why groups such as the Manchu were recognized, but other groups, such as the 
Cantonese, were incorporated into the Han majority.  Today, China has 56 different 
minzu, and there are still groups within the Han majority and other minorities who feel 
that they should be recognized as their own, separate minzu.   
 After officially establishing a political identity for minority groups in China, the 
CCP began to use a combination of accommodation and assimilation in order to 
incorporate ethnic minorities into the Chinese Communist state.  Although CCP-minority 
relations suffered initially from a mutual lack of understanding, the 1950s was a 
relatively peaceful decade, characterized by widespread accommodation (except for 
Tibet).  As was mentioned above, the CCP relied heavily on the Soviet Union for 
guidance in political, economic, and social matters; such guidance also included advice 
on how to handle its ethnic minorities.  Despite major differences in the demographic 
distribution of minorities in the PRC compared the USSR,4 Beijing was largely 
successful in its efforts to accommodate minorities in the 1950s.    
                                                 
1 Dru C. Gladney, Dislocating China: Muslims, Minorities, and Other Subaltern Subjects, (University 
of Chicago Press: Chicago, 2004), 9. 
2 The “Four Commons” were: common language, common territory, common economic life, and 
common psychological makeup (or culture).  These factors are, of course, highly subjective and since the 
1953 census, 15 more ethnic groups have been recognized, bringing the official total to 56 today. 
3 Gladney, Dislocating, 9. 
4 According to June Dreyer, nearly half of the population of the USSR was composed of non-Russians, 
4 
 Although CCP-minority relations in the early to mid-1950 have seemed to be 
characterized by accommodation, these relations began to shift during 1958-1959 
because of two major events: the Hundred Flowers Campaign and the Great Leap 
Forward.  During the Hundred Flowers campaign, Chinese intellectuals were encouraged 
to point out errors among CCP members, and to speak freely regarding the CCP’s 
policies.5  Minority intellectuals were among the individuals encouraged, but the 
criticisms raised by minorities were different than those raised by the Han.  For example, 
some minority intellectuals called for a halt in collectivization policies, citing them as 
against minority religions and customs.  Others criticized minority party officials, while 
still others called for outright secession.6   As a result of this criticism (and the criticism 
raised by Han intellectuals), Mao launched the “anti-rightist” campaign, which aimed to 
wipe out challenges to the CCP.  In minority areas, this campaign was directed at “local 
nationalism,” which resulted in the elimination of many traditional minority leaders who 
had held credibility with their people.7   
 The “anti-rightist” campaign was followed closely by the Great Leap Forward, 
which, according to Colin Mackerras, led to a period of deteriorating relations between 
the CCP and China’s ethnic minorities.8  When the CCP launched the Great Leap 
Forward during the spring and summer of 1958, the Party pushed a major effort to 
increase collectivization throughout China, especially in minority areas (which had not 
yet been subjected to these policies).  These collectivization efforts were met with 
resistance among minorities, which led to some ethnic tension.  However, Beijing’s 
attitude toward Chinese minorities, in light of the threat perceived during the Hundred 
Flowers Campaign, also shifted.  Traditional festivals, minority customs, and other 
“special characteristics” began to be perceived as direct threats to socialism, presumably 
                                                 
but in China, minorities comprise only about nine percent of the country.   
5 Kenneth Lieberthal, Governing China: From Revolution Through Reform 2nd Edition, (New York: 
WW Norton and Company, 2004), 101. 
6 June Teufel Dreyer, China’s Political System: Modernization and Tradition, (New York: 
Pearson/Longman, 2004), 296. 
7 Dreyer, 297. 
8 Colin Mackerras, China’s Ethnic Minorities and Globalization, (New York: Routledge Curzon, 
2003), 21. 
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because they contributed to reduced work efficiency among minority peoples.9  For 
example, time-consuming, intricately-woven hats and sashes were replaced with more 
practical belts and straw hats which allowed minority peoples more time to work.10  
These new, less tolerant policies during the Great Leap Forward led to outright instances 
of separatism among some minorities, namely the Tibetans, Uighurs, Yi, and Hui, 
signifying a major shift in CCP-minority relations.11 
 While the Great Leap Forward was a time of CCP-minority tension, its aftermath 
brought renewed accommodation among both minorities and the CCP.12  However, 
within five years, Mao launched the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (GPCR), a 
nation-wide campaign that brought devastation to Han and minority peoples alike.  
During the GPCR, Mao’s Red Guards attacked the “four olds” by destroying religious 
and cultural relics throughout the country.  It is difficult to compare the atrocities 
committed in minority areas with those in Han areas; as such events were extremely 
destructive.13  Minorities perceived the destruction of religious relics, mosques, temples, 
and other symbols as a full-scale attack on their respective cultures.   It is also important 
to recognize that troubles with minorities during the Cultural Revolution were blamed on 
class differences, rather than ethnic differences.14  The GPCR also led to violent incidents 
in minority areas, such as the Shadian rebellion in Yunnan province.  During the summer 
and fall of 1967, a group of Hui Chinese attempted to reopen a mosque, closed due to the 
Cultural Revolution.  When permission was refused, the Hui formed a militia and were 
accused of attempting to establish their own Islamic state.15  In the violence that 
followed, over one thousand Hui were killed and one participating village was 
completely destroyed. Relations began to change in 1971, however, when the Party began 
                                                 
9 Dreyer, 297. 
10 Ibid., 297. 
11 Mackerras, China’s Ethnic Minorities, 23. 
12 Ibid., 23. 
13 For a detailed account of atrocities committed in minority regions, see Patrick French,  Tibet, Tibet 
A Personal History of a Lost Land, (New York:  Knopf, 2003) 
14 Dru C. Gladney, Muslim Chinese: Ethnic Nationalism in the People’s Republic, (Cambridge: 
Harvard University, 1991), 138. 
15 Mackerras, China’s Ethnic Minorities , 24. 
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printing books in minority languages and allowed minority languages on the radio.16  
Despite this, the tense, even volatile CCP-minority relationship did not substantially 
improve until after Mao’s death. 
2. PRC Minority Policy After Mao Zedong 
Mao’s death and Deng Xiaoping’s ascension to power marked another major shift 
in CCP-minority relations in the PRC.  However, post-Mao CCP-minority relations did 
not begin with Deng Xiaoping; rather, Hua Guofeng took the first steps toward these 
improved relations.  In March of 1978, Hua addressed the Fifth National People’s 
Congress where he emphasized minority rights, autonomy, and accommodation.17  Deng 
Xiaoping followed Hua’s lead and began to grant the PRC’s minorities improved 
political, economic, and social freedoms.  To be sure, most of these freedoms were 
identical or very similar to many of the reforms enacted throughout Han China.  
However, the results of liberalization in and outside of minority areas ultimately had a 
major effect on CCP-minority relations: marked improvement occurred. 
 From a political standpoint, perhaps the most significant reform concerning 
minority peoples was the redrafting of the 1982 PRC constitution.  Compared to the 
previous, 1975 draft, the 1982 constitution, on paper, granted minorities considerable 
equality, compared to the Han majority.  For instance, article four reads that: 
All nationalities in the People’s Republic of China are equal.  The state 
protects the lawful rights and interests of the minority nationalities and 
upholds and develops the relationship of equality, unity, and mutual 
assistance among all China’s nationalities.  Discrimination against and 
oppression of any nationality are prohibited; any acts that undermine the 
unity of the nationalities or instigate their secession are prohibited…the 
people of all nationalities have the freedom to use and develop their own 
spoken and written customs, and to preserve or reform their own ways and 
customs.18 
                                                 
16 Dreyer, 301. 
17 Mackerras, China’s Ethnic Minorities, 25. 
18 Constitution of the People’s Republic of China (1982). 
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This explicit language, which guaranteed fair treatment, represented a major shift in the 
political status of minorities.  Minority affairs and problems were clearly no longer 
considered to be a problem of social class; by the language in the new constitution, 
everyone in China was to be treated equally.  The 1982 constitution also contained a great 
deal of guidance on the day-to-day operation of minority autonomous regions.  Section 
six and its 11 Articles outline a vague, but explicit acknowledgement of the autonomy of 
many minority regions.  These articles allowed the local governments of autonomous 
regions control over their own finances (Article 117), economic planning (Article 118), 
social affairs (Article 119), and to some extent, over local security forces (Article 120).19  
Article 116 also provided a means for local minority governments to draft and pass 
regulations of their own creation.20  Thus, politically, the new PRC constitution 
represented a sincere attempt by the CCP to improve CCP-minority relations. 
 Economically speaking, Deng Xiaoping took a number of steps to improve the 
welfare and standard of living for all Chinese, including minority peoples.  The opening 
of Special Economic Zones (SEZ’s) in the early 1980s did not directly affect large 
numbers of minorities (as none of the new SEZ’s fell explicitly in a minority autonomous 
area) but the few minorities located within these were allowed to partake in the economic 
benefits these policies yielded.  Additionally, minorities benefited from Deng’s land 
reforms and the liberal economic policies which allowed peasants to sell their goods on 
the open market.21  Though there were very few economic policies that were overtly 
directed at closing the wealth gap between the Han and the PRC’s minorities, the 
financial benefits that came with reform ensured improved living standards, and as a 
result, an improved CCP-minority relationship. 
 Perhaps the most important improvements made regarding CCP-minority 
relations under Deng Xiaoping concerned social equality.  Minorities were largely 
exempt from the one-child policy, for example, and various affirmative action programs 
granted minority peoples easier access to high-level education.  Additionally, the state 
began to repair the cultural damage inflicted upon minorities during the GPCR.  For 
                                                 
19 Constitution of the People’s Republic of China (1982). 
20 Ibid. 
21 Dreyer, 301. 
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example, in Hui communities, Sufi tombs and shrines were rebuilt on land that had 
originally been seized by the state.22  Reformed travel policies allowed Chinese Muslims 
to begin making the annual Islamic Hajj to Mecca.  In fact, in some cases, the PRC 
sponsored both official and unofficial Chinese pilgrims, providing financial assistance to 
many who could not afford the trip.23  Other social reforms also contributed improved 
CCP-minority relations.  In 1985, the revised Law of Regional Autonomy encouraged 
dramatic educational reforms in minority areas.24  These reforms, directed at eliminating 
illiteracy, directed local schools to instruct in both Mandarin and minority languages.  
These new social policies, while imperfect, represented a major push by Beijing to 
improve the status of CCP-minority relations in Deng China. 
 Despite the efforts made by Deng Xiaoping and the CCP, reform in China brought 
a few specific problems to minority areas; these issues have led to violence and the 
resulting crackdowns in places like Tibet and Xinjiang.  First, because many of the 
dramatic economic reforms initially affected the coastal areas (which are largely 
inhabited by Han), but not the frontier regions, the existing wealth gap between Han and 
minorities expanded.  This gap, which was exacerbated by inflation, led to feelings of 
exploitation by many minorities, including many Uighurs.25  Socially, educational 
reforms also produced some conflict.  For example, the rising costs of educational 
reforms in minority areas, along with controversial curriculums26 created frustration 
among Uighurs.27   
Minority frustration seems to have contributed to feelings of nationalism among 
both the Tibetans and the Uighurs in the late 1980s and early 1990s.  Beginning in the fall 
of 1987, demonstrations became increasingly common in Lhasa; by October, at least one 
                                                 
22 Gladney, Dislocating,  140. 
23 Roundtable before the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 108th Congress, Second 
Session, “Practicing Islam in Today’s China: Differing Realities for the Uighurs and the Hui,”  17 May 
2004.   
24 Linda Benson, “Education and Social Mobility among Minority Populations in Xinjiang,” in 
Xinjiang: China’s Muslim Borderland,  ed. S. Fredrick Starr (New York: Central Asia-Caucus Institute, 
2004), 197. 
25 Dreyer, 302. 
26 For example, in Xinjiang, students were tested on the Chinese version of the region’s history, an 
account which is highly and hotly disputed among many Uighurs today. 
27 Benson, 198. 
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full-scale riot had erupted.  With the Dalai Lama’s support, ethnic unrest in Tibet grew 
steadily into 1988 and 1989, resulting in martial law in Lhasa.  Ethnic frustration also led 
to major violence in Xinjiang.  The 1990 Baren Township incident marked the beginning 
of violent separatism in Xinjiang.  This severe unrest among Uighurs was likely 
encouraged by the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the subsequent independence 
of the Central Asian republics.  Since the early 1990s, the unrest in Tibet has almost 
completely ceased, though Uighur separatism did not begin to slow down until 1998.  In 
any case, the events of the late 1980s and early 1990s have clearly made an impression 
on the CCP and have directly influenced the PRC’s stance toward Tibetans and Uighurs 
today. 
 Beijing’s approach to its minorities today and during the 1990s has been two-
pronged: accommodate the non-threatening and assimilate those that pose a threat to 
Chinese domestic stability.  This dichotomy follows the CCP’s historical approach to its 
minorities: when the Party has felt threatened, it has cracked down and when it has not, it 
has accommodated.  From the CCP’s point of view, the majority of China’s minority 
people pose little or no threat to China’s security.  Thus, Beijing has made an honest 
attempt to accommodate groups like the Dai, and the Yi.  In modern China, significant 
privileges are granted to non-threatening Chinese minority groups, such as tax breaks, 
exemptions from the one-child policy, and special educational opportunities.28  In fact, 
the material benefits of Chinese minority status are so significant that there has recently 
been a major push by new minority groups to be “officially” recognized by the state as 
legitimate minzu.29  Additionally, the Chinese government has made a major effort to 
stress the PRC’s diversity and increase the perception that it truly is a multi-cultural state.  
A perfect example of this effort can be found by simply watching the Chinese New 
Year’s celebration held every year in Beijing.  The four-hour long celebration features 
dancers from diverse ethnic backgrounds: Tibetans, Mongols, Zhuang, Hui, Wa, and 
others.30  No less than half of the ceremony is dedicated to minority performers, despite 
the fact that minorities make up only nine percent of China’s total population.31  Thus, 
                                                 
28 Gladney, Dislocating, 23. 
29 Mackerras, China’s Ethnic Minorities, 40. 
30 Gladney, Dislocating, 55. 
31 Ibid., 55. 
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current Chinese policy toward its non-threatening minorities is very liberal, and Beijing 
enjoys its multi-cultural heritage.  
 While members of ethnic groups not perceived as a threat enjoy benefits under 
current CCP policy, groups that do pose a perceived threat are treated very differently.  
These groups, which include the Tibetans, Uighurs, and Mongols, are presently the 
victims of assimilation, rather than accommodation.  For example, despite the fact that 
unrest in Tibet has not had problems with separatism or violence since the early 1990s, 
Beijing’s treatment of the Tibetan people has not improved.  According to conversations 
with a variety of Tibetan subjects in Lhasa, China’s treatment of Tibetans is very poor.32  
One anonymous Tibetan told me that although conditions had improved since the 
Cultural Revolution, Tibetans are still subjected to intense prejudice, discrimination, and 
social repression.  For example, children in Tibet are often taken from their homes during 
early childhood and schooled in eastern China.  There, they are not taught Tibetan 
(instead they are taught Mandarin), and upon their return, have very little understanding 
of traditional Tibetan Buddhist teachings.  This man’s account of Beijing’s stance toward 
Tibet indicates a desire to assimilate young Tibetans into the broader Chinese state, 
which reveals a serious dichotomy in CCP-minority relations. 
3. The Uighur Civilization 
As this thesis is focused on two specific Muslim minority groups – the Uighurs 
and the Hui – it is also useful to specifically examine the history of both peoples.  In 
particular, Uighur history can be a very controversial subject as there are many issues - 
such as true Uighur identity and claims to the Tarim basin - that have been disputed by 
different parties.  Xinjiang has been and is still an extremely dynamic place because it is 
a crossroads where Russian, Chinese, Central Asian, South Asian, and Arab peoples 
interact.  This role, as a melting pot of civilizations can be used to help understand 
Xinjiang’s history.  The political history of the Uighurs and Xinjiang in general can be  
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defined by the north-south dynamic of nomadic peoples ruling and/or invading the 
agrarian south.33  The Uighur civilization is a byproduct of this political dynamic.34 
Although they were not originally Muslim, the first Uighur Empire was 
established in 744 in the Mongolian Orkhan River Valley.  This empire was destroyed by 
the Kyrgyz in 840 and relocated to near present-day Urumqi, straddling the Tianshan.   
Uighur kings ruled this area during the ninth through thirteenth centuries until the 1370s, 
when the Mongols destroyed it.  During the same time, the Karakhanids, a confederation 
of Turkish tribes which migrated west from Mongolia, ruled the Tarim Basin.  These 
Muslims linked Xinjiang to the Islamic world and introduced Islam to the Uighurs.  
Present-day Uighur identity stems primarily from a combination of the traditions of the 
original Uighur Empire and those of the Karakhanids.35   
The fall of the Uighur and Karakhanid Empires ushered in Xinjiang’s Mughal 
period, which lasted from fourteenth through seventeenth centuries.  Under Mongol rule 
increasing numbers of Uighurs began to convert to Islam.  The Mughal period was also a 
time of trade, as the Silk Road allowed Uighurs to trade with Chinese, other oases, and 
Central Asian empires.36  In the 1670s, the Zungars took control of Xinjiang, which 
began a struggle between the Russians and various Sufi factions.  Finally, in 1754 the 
Manchu Qing Empire conquered Xinjiang, though, according to some scholars, the 
province was not brought under the Han Chinese realm until 1821.37  However, Qing 
control of Xinjiang fluctuated frequently and this led to major fractures in Uighur 
identity; loyalty to one’s oasis became more important than to a Uighur nation.  When the 
Qing dynasty collapsed in 1911, a number of factors contributed to the further 
fragmentation of the Uighurs including political loyalties (to China, Russia, and Britain 
                                                 
33 James A. Millward and Peter Perdue, “Political and Cultural History of the Xinjiang Region through 
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36  Ibid., 47. 
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as a result of the Great Game), territorial loyalties, and religious loyalties.38  Despite this, 
the Uighurs established the independent East Turkistan during the Republican period, 
which lasted until the CCP incorporated Xinjiang into the PRC.  Though East Turkistan 
was only independent for a brief time, many older Uighurs think highly of the founders of 
the East Turkistan Republic and the writings of old resistance leaders are still available 
today.39  However, it is unclear as to what extent the East Turkistan Republic period  
influences separatists today; more likely, separatists in Xinjiang are more motivated by 
the fall of the Soviet Union and the break-up of the Central Asian republics.40 
4. Uighur Separatism in Recent Years 
   Beijing’s relations with its Uighur minority have been rocky throughout the 
history of the PRC and in the 1990s poor relations evolved into crisis.  In response to 
Chinese actions in Xinjiang, Uighur activists have repeatedly engaged in violent and 
rebellious activity directed at Chinese interests and state authority in the name of an 
independent Xinjiang.   According to a report issued by the Chinese State Council in 
2002, “East Turkistan” terrorists caused over 200 incidents in and outside of China 
during the 1990s which resulted in 162 deaths and 440 wounded.41  The report divided 
incidents into six major categories: explosions, assassinations, attacks on police and 
government institutions, crimes of poison and arson, establishing secret training bases 
and raising money, and organizing disturbances, riots, and an atmosphere of terror.42  
Violent separatism is not a new phenomenon in Xinjiang, but separatist efforts received 
renewed vigor after the 1990 Baren incident.  Accounts of the incident vary, but 
according to the Chinese report a number of armed separatists took hostages and killed 
                                                 
38 Dru C. Gladney, Dislocating 216. 
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six Chinese policemen.  This incident was documented worldwide and marked the 
beginning of the latest era of Uighur separatism. 
 After the Baren incident, violence in Xinjiang became increasingly common.  
Major demonstrations, assassinations, and bombings occurred throughout Xinjiang from 
1990-1997, killing dozens.43  Such events did not capture major international attention, 
however.  A second major incident, which was well-documented in newspapers 
worldwide, occurred in the town of Yining (Ghulja), northeast of Kashgar.  According to 
newspaper reports, Muslims and police clashed during riots, after the Chinese arrested 
dozens of Uighurs.44  Beijing tried to downplay the significance of the riots, but the 
apparent fallout from the attack was equally bloody, as three bus bombings in Urumqi 
killed five three weeks later.  According to the Chinese report, there were also several 
incidents in 1998 and 1999, but of these were not well-documented in Western 
newspapers.   
Despite the bloody 1990s, the intensity of separatism in Xinjiang seems to have 
declined in the last six years.  Aside from a number of assassinations throughout Central 
Asia and Xinjiang, there have been very few instances of separatism, even according to 
the Chinese report.  In fact, according to Millward, it has become increasingly difficult to 
connect Uighur groups to the violent incidents that have occurred.45  However, fears of 
separatists still persist throughout Xinjiang and attacks do occur periodically.  According 
to the Xinhua News Agency, the bombing of a Xinjiang bus killed 22 on 27 March 
2003.46  This has led some analysts to believe “all the indications are that China faces a 
major increase in Uighur militancy.”47  In summary, China’s problem with Uighur 
separatism has been bloody throughout the last twenty years, but its future is uncertain. 
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5. China’s Hui Minority 
China’s Hui are the second ethnic group on which this thesis will focus; the next 
sections will introduce the Hui ethnicity and outline a brief history of the Hui people.  
According to Michael Dillon, the history of the Hui people dates back to the seventh 
century, when the Chinese began interacting with Middle Eastern Muslims, shortly after 
the establishment of Islam.48  Most of this contact occurred between Chinese, Arab, and 
Persian traders; in fact, these traders were primarily responsible for Islam’s introduction 
into China proper in the following centuries.  Arab and Persian traders began to visit 
Chinese ports at Guangzhou, Quanzhou, and Hangzhou during the Tang Dynasty (618-
907).49  As trade ties increased, these Muslims began building mosques, temples and 
cemeteries, which led to the establishment of small Muslim communities in eastern 
China.   
Muslims also migrated to China through the Silk Road in Central Asia.  Under the 
Yuan Dynasty (1279-1378), thousands of Muslims from Central Asia entered western 
China, leading to the first legal establishment of a societal hierarchy in China: Mongols, 
foreigners, Han, and Nan.50  It was also at this time that the Chinese developed the term 
“Hui,” which originally began as a Chinese transliteration of the word “Uighur.”51  
Though this term was first officially recognized by Jiang Jieshi’s Nationalist government, 
the term “Hui” came to be commonly used as the word for Islam.  Muslims continued 
entering China during the Ming and Qing dynasties, through traders and Central Asian 
migrants.  As time wore on, Islam began to spread throughout all of China proper, and 
prevalent Hui communities were established in provinces such as present-day Gansu, 
Shaanxi, Yunnan, and Ningxia.  China’s Muslims preserved their religious identity, 
despite some Chinese crackdowns, through the use of extensive Islamic education 
efforts.52  These efforts were increased as Muslims became increasingly assimilated into 
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the societies in which they were located.  However, some education efforts failed, 
resulting in differing levels of assimilation throughout the country.  Even today, these 
different levels of assimilation are evident, as Hui Muslims in SE China live very 
different lifestyles than those in the northwest.53 
 It was only after the CCP established the People’s Republic of China in 1949 that 
the word “Hui” came to be used to describe a specific ethnic group.  In the early 1950s, 
the CCP sent census takers throughout China, responsible for identifying ethnic groups.  
In the years that followed, Beijing recognized 10 separate Muslim ethnic groups, 
including the Hui (and the Uighurs).  The system, however, was not perfect.  According 
to Djamal al-Din Bai Shouyi, a Hui historian, the Hui people were different than Central 
Asian Muslims in that they could not be identified using Stalin’s “Four Commons.”54  In 
fact, according to some scholars, China’s Hui population does not satisfy the 
requirements of any of the Four Commons, as they have no common language, economic 
life, territory, or psychological makeup.55  Bai heavily influenced Beijing’s decision to 
categorize all of China’s Muslims who did not fit into the other nine ethnic groups as Hui 
minzu.  Today, the term “Hui minzu” is assigned to Chinese Muslims who do not speak 
their own, unique language, but rather adopt the language of the populace in which they 
live.56  Such a broad definition of the Hui has led many scholars to believe that their 
ethnic identity is equally wide-spread and imprecise.  This is an important debate and it 
will be reviewed briefly in the literature review of this thesis. 
6. Hui Reactions to Chinese Minority Policy 
While Uighurs have responded to Chinese policy with violence directed at 
Chinese interests and authority, Hui reactions have been very different.  Chinese policy is 
often created at national levels and its execution is left to local levels to enforce.  Since 
the Hui minority is widely spread throughout the PRC, local policy enforcement and 
minority treatment has varied.  This has produced a range of Hui reactions, from peaceful 
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accommodation to outbreaks of violence.  However, when Hui responses to policy have 
become violent, the motivations behind the violence seem to be different.  Unlike Uighur 
separatism, Hui violence in China seems to stem from ethnic tension between Hui and 
Han Chinese, not desires for independence or secession.   
 Violent incidents among Hui have occurred and it is important to recognize this 
fact.  For example, as recently as 2004 a dozen people were killed when thousands of Hui 
villagers clashed with Han farmers.57  In Sichuan province, the week before, over 50,000 
Hui villagers participated in a violent protest that led to several casualties.58 According to 
Lipman, other instances of violence have occurred in the heart of China throughout the 
past decade.59  In Shandong province in 2000, Han paramilitary police, state police, and 
Hui protesters clashed, killing at least five Muslims.60  In Hebei province, hundreds of 
Muslims in Mengcun reacted to the hanging of a pig head on a mosque in another village; 
this resulted in severe violence, causing police to fire into the crowds.61  However, to say 
that these incidents reflect separatist desires or challenges to PRC or CCP authority 
would be misguided.  Rather, they reflect small-scale, localized misunderstandings 
between China’s ethnic minorities (who happen to be Muslim) and the Han majority.62 
Despite some degree of ethnic tension among Hui and Han Chinese, there seems 
to be little doubt that the Hui are loyal to the PRC.  As was mentioned, the majority of 
Hui communities across China have responded to Chinese occupation through mutual 
accommodation.  In other cases, however, Hui Chinese have reacted to policy through 
protests, rallies, and other nonviolent forms of resistance.  For example, shortly before 
the Tiananmen protests in 1989, hundreds of thousands of Muslims rallied in Beijing, 
protesting the publication of a controversial book.63 These Muslims, who were mainly 
Hui, demanded that Beijing immediately ban the book and burn all available copies.  
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Interestingly enough, despite the mass numbers of people who rallied, the protest stayed 
peaceful and according to Gladney, it seemed as if the Muslims were protesting to the 
Chinese government, rather than against it.64  This is a key difference; unlike Uighur 
separatists, China’s Hui recognize the necessity of the PRC and its authority.   Thus, 
though there is evidence of ethnic violence among Hui Chinese, its nature is completely 
different than that of the Uighurs and this reflects Hui support of the PRC. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
1. Separatism Literature 
Literature assessing separatism spans the academic arena from political science to 
social psychology, but an integrative approach seems to be the most useful.  There are 
many different frameworks by which one may analyze separatist movements and no 
single approach seems to completely explain the causes of separatism.  For the purposes 
of this thesis, the literature on separatism/secession theory has been broken into three 
schools of thought: the identity school, the process school, and the grievances school.  
None of these schools seem to provide complete explanations, but each offers important 
insight into the roots of separatism.  This thesis will integrate these three approaches in 
order to analyze the differences between the Uighur and Hui minority groups.   
 The first major school of thought regarding separatism is the identity school, 
which emphasizes the factors that contribute to increased group consciousness and the 
emergence of an identity-based separatist movement.  According to Ralph Premdas, there 
are two major types of factors which cause separatism: primordial and secondary.65  
Primordial factors are long-standing divisions within a society that contribute to minority 
identity. Examples include language, culture, values, ethnicity, and religion.  Secondary 
factors consist of shared features or experiences that have been recently acquired by 
minority groups, such as assimilation, colonialism, repression, or abuse by a central 
government.  Primary factors tend to be more difficult for a central state to reconcile than 
secondary factors.  It is important to understand that these factors only lead to separatism 
when a catalyst for change takes place.   Such a catalyst often creates a new 
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consciousness among the ethnic group, sparking new nationalism and a new collective 
identity.66  There are also other factors that can influence the development of such a 
movement including charismatic leaders, the role of intellectuals, and the solidarity of the 
movement’s participants.  One weakness of this approach is that Premdas never defined 
the term “catalyst” and it is unclear as to what sorts of events might spark a change in 
collective consciousness.  Despite this, however, the identity school provides intriguing 
insight into the causes of separatism. It also incorporates a number of factors which other 
approaches have neglected, such as the role of nationalism and that of culture.  Thus, it 
serves as a useful addition to other frameworks analyzed in this literature review. 
 The second major school of thought regarding separatism examines the processes 
through which separatist movements evolve.  There are many different approaches within 
this school and this thesis will examine two.  First, according to John Wood, there are 
five major progressions in a separatist movement: preconditions, the rise of the 
movement, the state’s response, escalation/the point of no return, and resolution 
(sometimes by armed conflict).67  Wood states that a secessionist movement begins with 
preconditions which fall into five different categories.  When enough of these 
preconditions are present, ethnic tension may eventually give way to a movement, 
depending on the ideology, group solidarity, and the strategy pursued by movement 
leaders.  When such a movement emerges, the central state’s response will have a 
profound impact on the future of the movement.68  The central state has two choices: 
repress the movement or use political institutions to better accommodate the desires of 
separatists.  Assuming the state’s response is insufficient; a movement will continue to 
progress until it passes the “point of no return.”69  When this point has been reached, the 
movement will most likely result in a violent resolution.  However, Wood notes that the 
majority of such movements are resolved before they reach the point of no return.70  This 
framework provides some important insights into the dynamics of the evolution of 
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secessionist movements, but its ability to predict the emergence of a movement is rather 
limited.  For example, Wood uses a very large number of broad preconditions that may 
lead to separatism and secession.  However, he does not specify to what extent each must 
be true for a movement to emerge.  Moreover, he does not clearly identify how to tell 
when the “point of no return” has been reached.  Without these details, it is difficult to 
evaluate why different groups under similar conditions have not broken into 
separatism/secession.   
 A second approach within the process school emphasizes the role of identity in 
the process involved with a separatist movement.  This approach might be thought of as a 
hybrid of the identity and the processes schools because it demonstrates how ethnic 
identity affects the process behind a separatist movement.71  David Brown argues that an 
ethnicity’s sense of identity can strengthen in light of perceived economic exploitation, 
ethnic colonialism, and pervasive state policies.72  Minority elites then use these strong 
feelings of identity in order create personal legitimacy and social mobilization.73  In light 
of this increased mobilization, ethnic separatist movements may emerge.74  Such 
movements often have differing ideologies, but they possess a certain amount of unity 
based on their discontent with the central state.  This approach provides limited insight 
into the context of ethnic identity that emerges in light of state repression.  It provides a 
valuable addition to Wood, but even taken together, these approaches within the process 
school fail to explain the role of external and political factors.  Thus, this school of 
thought is important to consider, but by itself, it does not provide answers to the research 
questions in this thesis. 
The third school, used by groups such as Amnesty International and the private 
media, focuses on the impact of specific grievances on a minority group’s desires for 
separatism.75  This school emphasizes abuse, economic exploitation, and oppression.  
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Such state policies may create a group collective to rebel and/or demand autonomy.  This 
collective consciousness exists separately from any religious, ethnic, or nationalistic 
identities that may or may not be present.  Instead, it reflects the desires of a repressed 
people to end the repression.  Such an approach must be considered when studying 
Chinese Muslims.  However, because this approach places such an emphasis on 
repression and abuse, it is difficult to find objective, reliable data with which to analyze a 
case study.  Data involving abuse is often one-sided, regardless of the source.  Without 
objective accounts of repression and the effects that such repression has on separatist 
movements, it is difficult to use this approach for explanatory purposes.76  Moreover, an 
oppression-centric framework neglects many aspects of separatism such as identity 
politics and the impact of external forces.  Thus, though the grievances school may 
provide limited insight into the causes of separatism, such an approach is too subjective 
and narrowly-focused to solely provide an explanation for separatism.     
2. Uighur Literature 
Turning to current literature regarding ethnic tension among the Uighur and Hui 
minorities, the grievances and identity have been most commonly believed to explain the 
causes of Uighur separatism.  In terms of grievances, one of the most important issues is 
Han immigration.  According to Becquelin, China’s major goals in the 1990s concerning 
Xinjiang included increasing its military presence in the region and quickening its 
systematic Han migration to the province.77  Han migration, locally called “mixing sand,” 
consists of Beijing’s policies of providing incentives to encourage migrant Han Chinese 
to relocate to Xinjiang throughout the 1980s-present.    These incentives have proved 
successful.  For example, over 70,000 migrant workers moved to the Xinjiang Production 
Corps city of Shihezi in 1997.78  Also in 1997, Xinjiang’s provincial government 
admitted that hundreds of thousands of workers from across China have been moving to 
Xinjiang.  These migrations have led to deteriorating relations between Han and Uighur 
residents, resulting in increased disputes between the two ethnic groups.   
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A second grievance that is blamed for Uighur separatism focuses on the pseudo-
colonial policies that Beijing has used to better incorporate Xinjiang with the Han 
Chinese state.79  These arguments range in focus, but cover political and economic 
realms.  Politically, Gardner Bovingdon has argued that the institutional structure of 
Xinjiang’s autonomy reflects a major cause of Uighur separatism.  He argued that 
Chinese political policy toward the XUAR has reduced the Uighur ability to control the 
province, but it has also increased the Uighur sense of collective identity.80   For 
example, Beijing has systematically reduced the number of Uighurs with authority in the 
Xinjiang provincial government.  As this has occurred, the Uighurs have felt increasingly 
excluded from decision-making processes.  In turn, the Uighurs have found a common 
enemy against which to unite: their Han leadership.   
Economically, the Uighurs also consider themselves to be the victims of Beijing 
policies.  According to Dru Gladney, the Uighurs perceive Chinese economic policies 
toward Xinjiang as “ethnic colonialism.”81 That is, Beijing is systematically exploiting 
Xinjiang in order to extract resources and provide wealth for the rest of the Han Chinese 
nation-state.82  Tension in Xinjiang has been exacerbated by the Uighur perception of a 
wealth gap among Han and Uighur residents.  Moreover, many Uighurs believe that 
Chinese immigrants have stolen natural resources and other wealth which should rightly 
belong to Xinjiang’s natives.83  These economic issues have been widely blamed by 
scholars and journalists for causing Uighur separatism. 
Though grievances provide a partial explanation for Uighur separatism, it is 
important to consider identity.  The idea of identity among Uighurs has been extremely 
controversial among Western academics, as there is a large debate regarding the basis on 
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which Chinese Muslims identify with each other.  There are currently two major camps 
into which Western academics fall: religion and ethnicity.  Some scholars, such as 
Raphael Israeli, argue that Chinese Muslims tend to associate their religion as an 
underlying source of unity.84 Scholars in this camp argue that Islamic revivalism is 
currently underway in China and this movement can be blamed for at least some of the 
violence by Chinese Muslims.85  The second camp, represented by Dru Gladney, argues 
that ethnicity is the predominant quality with which Chinese Muslims identify.  Gladney 
has argued that Chinese Muslims exist on a scale of integration with the Han Chinese 
state.  The Hui can be seen on the most integrated side, with the Uighurs at the extreme 
end of the non-integrated side.86  Despite Chinese efforts to assimilate all of its 
minorities, including Muslims, because the Uighurs identify with their ethnicity and not 
their faith, they are unlikely to allow themselves to be assimilated with the Chinese state.  
This unwillingness to assimilate has created some sense of nationalism and in extreme 
cases, violent separatism.87 
The emergence of Uighur identity may also be attributed to Chinese educational 
and religious oversight.  According to Dwyer, the Chinese state has pursued language 
policies that have created the Uighur perception of cultural destruction.88  For example, 
the Chinese state has reduced the number of Uighur-language schools in favor of 
Mandarin-language institutes.   
Beijing has also taken active measures to control the role of Islam in Uighur society.  
Males under the age of 18 are not permitted in Xinjiang’s mosques and Uighurs perceive 
this policy as Beijing’s way of restricting the Uighur way of life.  As a result, Uighurs are 
forced to turn to underground mosques in order to preserve their culture.  Proponents of 
this point of view argue that since the Chinese loosened their religious policies in the 
1970s violence has been on the rise in Xinjiang.  It is also true that there are religious 
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figures in Xinjiang that seek to promote violence against the Chinese state.  According to 
Mackerras, South Xinjiang in particular is home to several extremist Muslim clerics that 
preach extremist rhetoric and encourage Uighurs to fight against their Chinese 
repressors.89  However, the Islamic argument does not explain why Uighurs have 
engaged in separatism but other Muslim minorities (such as the Hui) have not.  Hence, 
Islam alone cannot be used to explain the causes of Uighur separatism.   
These social policies all create fear within the Uighur populace as they feel their 
culture is being contained and reduced.90  Such fear has led to the emergence of Uighur 
identity, though the number of identities that may be found among Uighurs has been 
widely debated. In any case, Uighur identity likely plays some role in explaining the roots 
of separatism.   
Though most acknowledge that grievances and identity play a role in explaining 
Uighur separatism, external factors are also important to consider.  Colin Mackerras, for 
example, has blamed outside influences for inciting separatism in Xinjiang.91  According 
to him, outsiders, such as Central Asian Uighur exiles, the West, and Islamic groups have 
contributed to Uighur separatism by actively inciting subversion.  This point of view has 
also been adopted by the Chinese state, but as a whole, the argument is not persuasive.  
For one, the Uighurs do not possess any major external leadership structure or leadership 
figure (like the Tibetan Dalai Lama). Additionally, there is very little evidence that 
Uighur separatists have received substantial aid from external sources.  To be sure, there 
are several groups of Uighur exiles and activists that operate outside of China.  
Additionally, the number of internet sites sponsoring Uighur opposition groups has 
grown steadily throughout the last 15 years.92  Thus, external forces may be blamed for 
perpetuating separatism among Uighurs, but it seems unlikely that they are an actual 
cause.   
While there has been much debate over the causes of Uighur separatism, the 
question of why Uighurs rebel, while other Muslim ethnic minorities do not has not 
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received much attention.  This question represents a gap in current scholarship and the 
issue needs to be explored more carefully.  It is now time to examine China’s Hui 
minority and the ways in which the Hui fit into the grievances and identity schools of 
separatism.  It is also useful to examine the role of external factors on the Hui minority. 
3. Hui Literature 
 Like the Uighurs, China’s Hui do not possess an organized resistance group.  
According to Gladney, the Hui are primarily Han Chinese, but they tend to blend in well 
with the indigenous inhabitants of the places in which they live.  For example, Hui living 
in Tibet tend to speak Tibetan, while Hui living in Beijing will often speak Mandarin.  
This has unique implications for evaluating Han-Hui relations.  According to Lipman, 
unlike the Uighur question, Beijing’s relationship with the Hui must be understood at the 
local, rather than the national level.93  In most places, Han cadre and Hui minority leaders 
have managed to cooperate, allowing them to resolve disputes peacefully.  However, in a 
few locations, the Hui and the Han have clashed and occasionally engaged in violence.  
Such violence has not reflected a Hui desire to secede or break away from the Chinese 
state however, and in general, Han-Hui relations have been relatively peaceful. The 
nature of relations varies from place to place and violence has only been used by a few 
Hui outliers.  
Grievances seem to be conspicuous in Han-Hui relations.  Han migration in 
particular is important to consider.  Like the Uighurs, the Hui maintain a different way of 
life than China’s Han majority.  However, because the Hui live all over China, migration 
policies have affected the Hui differently than they have affected the Uighurs.  Most Hui 
communities have adapted to their proximity with Han neighbors without incident.94    
Despite Han migration throughout China, the Hui have been able to maintain some 
degree of local autonomy.95  Such autonomy has undoubtedly led to relatively peaceful 
Han-Hui relations.  Relations have been especially peaceful in regions where the Hui 
have remained in the majority.96  However, in locations where Hui are both small 
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minorities and the local Han cadre allow little minority autonomy, clashes have occurred.  
In sum, migration policies have affected the Hui differently than they have affected the 
Uighurs; this difference may partly explain why Uighurs have resorted to separatism and 
Hui have not. 
Internal colonialism and assimilation have also played a role in Han-Hui relations, 
but with less significance than the Uighur case.  When the Han pressure to assimilate 
begins to overtake Hui nationalism tension may emerge.97  In response, Han and Hui 
people tend to minimize everyday contact so that a relative peace can still be achieved.  
However, intense social situations like this exist in many places throughout China where 
the Hui are a substantial minority.  Most Hui are able to live with a tense Han-Hui social 
relationship, but at times, catalysts can turn a tense situation into a violent confrontation.  
Examples of such situations are very uncommon in China today, though in 1856 a 
rebellion in Yunnan resulted in the deaths of millions of Hui.98  Despite the potential for 
violence among the Hui, the majority of Hui communities either do not experience 
intense assimilation or have reacted to it without violent confrontations. 
Identity also plays a role in Han-Hui relations.  As was discussed above, the Hui 
have tended to adapt closely with the indigenous populace and this has led many Hui to 
find a niche in contemporary Chinese society.  According to Gladney, the Hui can be 
seen as the most closely incorporated Muslim minority into Chinese society and 
culture.99 From an ethnic perspective, the fact that the Han and Hui share some sense of 
ethnic similarity undoubtedly creates the basis for a peaceful relationship.  However, 
according to Chuah, the fact that the Hui do have a distinct identity has contributed to 
some tension between the Han and Hui.100  Distrust, prejudice, and discrimination from 
both sides has contributed to tension and intensified hostility between the two peoples.  
Hui identity is also important from a religious perspective.  Many Hui identify strongly 
with Islam and disruption of religious activities has, at times, sparked ethnic unrest.   
Thus, Han-Hui relations in China are clearly tied to the politics of identity. 
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Finally, it is important to recognize the role external factors play in Han-Hui 
relations.  As China’s economic interests in the Middle East have increased, Muslim 
countries have begun to take an increased interest in Beijing’s treatment of its Muslim 
minorities.101  However, it is nearly unthinkable that a Middle Eastern would intervene 
on behalf of the Hui, in the event of major Chinese repression.  Moreover, the majority of 
Hui living abroad have not taken steps to create expatriate communities.  Instead, they 
have largely conformed to overseas Chinese communities with only a few identifying 
characteristics (such as halal restaurants).102  Thus, without major external assistance, it 
appears that such factors have little impact on Han-Hui relations. 
 The reasons for the Hui tendency to avoid separatism are unclear and competing 
ideas have been debated.    It is clear that Han-Hui relations are very different than Han-
Uighur.  This distinction raises an important question: with whom do the Hui most 
closely relate, the Uighurs or the Han?   Insight into this question is critical in order to 
explain the Hui reluctance to use separatism.   According to Lipman, ethnically, the Hui 
are virtually identical to the Han majority.   Hui speak Mandarin, look like Han, and live 
in nearly every city in China.  Thus, from an ethnic perspective, the Hui may identify 
very closely with the Han Chinese.  Lipman also argues that because of this identification 
with the Han, the Hui have no separatist desires.  In other words, despite a few specific 
grievances, the Hui are loyal to the PRC as a nation-state.103  Lipman’s argument has 
been expanded upon by other authors.  According to Gladney, many Hui are critical of 
Uighur separatism and view such action as disloyalty to the Chinese state.104  The 
arguments favoring ethnic identity integration as the cause of a lack of separatism are not 
flawless, however.  One must recall the identity debate facing Chinese Muslims.  Authors 
such as Israeli have argued that Chinese Muslims identify very strongly with Islam, not 
ethnicity.  Proponents of this argument say that the Hui are not loyal to the Chinese state 
or any ethnic nation, only with a global Islamic identity.  This identification with a global 
religion and not with a unified, isolated group has contributed to the lack of a separatism 
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movement among the Hui.  Thus, this issue is clearly a matter of debate and there is 
currently no single answer as to why the Hui have not attempted a major separatist 
movement.    
 As demonstrated above, previous studies have debated the motivations and future 
of China’s Muslims.   The lack of definitive answers to these questions has provided the 
opportunity to expand on the current debate.  This thesis will add to the current literature 
by making a direct comparison of China’s two largest Muslim ethnic groups.  This 
comparison will seek insight into the following questions, why do Uighurs engage in 
separatism, but Hui do not?  What are the prospects for ethnic peace among Chinese 
Muslims? 
D. METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES 
This thesis will use Steven Van Evera’s method of a controlled comparison 
regarding the causes of ethnic separatism.  According to his Guide to Methods for 
Students of Political Science, this method compares observations regarding two or more 
case studies in order to test a theory.  The hypothesis in this thesis is that Uighurs use 
separatism and Hui do not because of grievances and identity issues.  In order to test this 
argument, this thesis has first established the similarities between the two groups.  Next, 
the differences between the Uighurs and the Hui will be evaluated on grievances and 
identity politics.  This thesis will then attempt to show that these differences are the 
reasons behind the inconsistency among Chinese Muslims’ reactions to CCP policies. 
 This study uses primary sources including interviews with both Uighurs and Hui 
and translated Chinese media sources.  I also draw on ten days of field work which I 
conducted in western China during June and July of 2006.   My secondary sources come 
from a variety of scholarly journal articles and books.   
 I conducted field research in Kashgar and Urumqi, China from 27 June 2006-8 
July 2006.105  Because of Chinese law, field work in the PRC is extremely restricted.  
Thus, I adapted my research methodology to accommodate local laws and regulations.  
My interpreter and travel partner was Assistant Professor Haning Hughes from the Air 
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Force Academy’s Department of Foreign Languages.  In order to conduct my research, I 
relied on two main methods:  observation and interviewing.   
 During my time in Xinjiang, Professor Hughes and I made a concerted effort to 
observe the local economic and social conditions, from both the Han Chinese and 
Uighurs’ points of view.   To do this effectively, we traveled extensively on foot and at 
times, by donkey cart.  Taking pictures to document our experiences, we explored as 
much of Xinjiang as we could, given our time and monetary constraints.  We both 
maintained detailed daily journals in which we recorded our experiences, thoughts, and 
reflections.  By doing this, I feel that we gained a somewhat limited but important 
perspective regarding contemporary Xinjiang and the social and economic conditions 
which facing the people there. 
 Observation is important, but without interacting with the people of Xinjiang, it 
would have been impossible to gain any sense of how the Han and Uighur interact in 
modern China.  Throughout our time in Xinjiang, Professor Hughes and I conducted 
dozens of informal, but structured interviews with a wide variety of Xinjiang’s residents.  
We did our best to interact with as broad of a sampling of Uighurs as possible: old, 
young, assimilated, unassimilated, rich, poor, etc…  Additionally, we conducted a 
number of interviews with Han Chinese, Hui Chinese, and other ethnic groups.  Despite 
our efforts to find expatriates, we were only able to interview one, a British citizen, at 
length.  Most interviews were conducted in Mandarin Chinese and Professor Hughes 
provided language support when necessary.  On some occasions, we used English and 
even Uighur to interview people.  English was used when the subject felt most 
comfortable with its use.  Uighur was used on a few occasions when we happened to 
have a bilingual Uighur standing nearby.  These interviews provided extensive insight 
into the mindsets of Uighurs, Hui, and Han Chinese living in Xinjiang. 
 Finding interviewees under the unique constraints of Chinese law was challenging 
at times and our methodology for interviewing was somewhat unorthodox.  In order to 
find subjects, we generally started by shopping.  In a market, for instance, we often began 
by demonstrating interest in a particular product.  While Professor Hughes browsed, I 
would often begin to converse with people standing nearby about everyday subjects, such 
as the day’s business.  Generally, I then began asking questions about the informant’s 
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family, their past, and so on, at which point, Haning would intervene.  She would explain 
that we were American tourists and that we were curious about Xinjiang.  Working 
together, we then asked a variety of questions and let the informant guide the interview.  
Because of the nature of some of our research goals and PRC law, it was not possible to 
ask direct questions, such as “how do you feel about the current social conditions in 
Xinjiang?”  Instead, we asked vague questions that often led to an extensive discussion, 
from which we were able to draw conclusions regarding the informant’s opinions.  In 
order to maintain discretion, we did not take notes during the interview, however, after 
each, we went to a restaurant or our hotel and took extensive notes concerning what we 
had heard.  Through this methodology, we interviewed a large number of subjects and 
gained many important insights into the dynamics of life in Xinjiang. 
 Throughout our trip, we also conducted dozens of brief, less detailed surveys 
where we asked a few common questions to a number of people, with which there was 
not time to conduct a lengthy interview.  Our questions were usually in regard to Han-
Uighur relations, Uighur identity, and Uighur beliefs regarding Islam.  Of those surveyed, 
taxi drivers proved to be our most fruitful sources of information, though we tried to ask 
people from many different backgrounds: tour guides, merchants, teenagers, and others.  
These short encounters provided interesting supplements to the insights gained through 
longer, more detailed interviews. 
 Finally, it is important to recognize that the interview data collected will be used 
in this thesis only as supporting evidence and not as the basis for any assertions.  The sole 
exception for this approach concerns my discussion of Uighur cultural identity in Chapter 
III for which there is a lack of literature.  I recognize that the fieldwork performed for 
writing this thesis was far too incomplete to draw many independent conclusions.  
Though we interviewed dozens of people, quality field research requires hundreds of 
subjects and given the constraints of time and money, such research was simply not 
possible.  Still, many of those interviewed confirmed the extensive field research 
performed by other researchers, which have been cited in this thesis.  Thus, I will use 
anecdotal evidence from my time in China as supporting evidence, but not as a sole 
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II. THE POLITICS OF MINORITY GRIEVANCES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The grievances school provides a useful framework for evaluating the differences 
between the Uighur and Hui reactions to CCP policies.  Though it does not completely 
account for the causes of separatism, the grievances school is nonetheless a valuable 
framework for evaluating separatist movements.  As it is often used by human rights 
groups and media activists, the grievances school has been criticized for providing a 
biased account of events and policies.  The grievances school maintains that separatist 
movements rise out of perceptions of inequality among members of peripheral ethnic 
groups within a state.  These perceptions, which are generally political, economic, and 
social in nature, are created by specific policies of a host government toward minority 
groups.  For instance, religious persecution might cause a minority group to mobilize and 
engage in acts of violence directed at state authority.  In the case of the PRC, two 
particular grievances are often blamed for creating perceptions of inequality among some 
ethnic groups:  Han migration and internal colonialism.  Beijing’s sponsorship of Han 
migrant workers has created Uighur perceptions of inequality and forced assimilation, but 
the Hui have generally adapted to increased numbers of Han migrants.  Additionally, 
CCP colonial policies, such as economic exploitation and social crackdowns seem to 
have been accommodated by the Hui, but not by the Uighurs.  Under closer review, 
however, such an outlook misses a number of important points.  Chinese minority policy, 
like most CCP policies, has varied considerably in its execution throughout different 
regions of the country.  This has given local officials free reign to enforce policy along 
ethnic lines.  This chapter will argue that the CCP policies toward Uighurs have been 
executed in relatively more restrictive ways than those toward Hui Chinese.  Because 
Uighurs have faced harsher economic and social conditions as a result of CCP policy, 
they have perceived greater inequality (relative to the Han Chinese) than have the Hui.  
This difference in perceptions helps to explain the differences in reactions by two ethnic 
groups.  
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This chapter will use two different grievances – Han immigration and inequalities 
created by internal colonialism - to demonstrate the differences between the Uighurs and 
the Hui.  For each grievance, a short description of how policies have been implemented 
toward Chinese minorities in general will be provided.  For each minority, this chapter 
will evaluate the extent to which these policies have contributed to ethnic tension in 
China and why.  Finally, this chapter will draw direct comparisons between the two 
groups’ responses to these two grievances and review explanations for Uighur separatism 
and Hui accommodation based on this comparison.   
B. HAN MIGRATION, INTERNAL COLONIALISM AND ASSIMILATION 
In order to understand the differences in the ways in which Chinese policy has 
affected the Uighurs and Hui, it is first necessary to briefly overview the ways in which 
migration, colonial, and assimilation policies have affected Chinese minorities in general.  
Since the establishment of the PRC in 1949, Beijing has placed an emphasis on 
developing China’s frontiers and integrating China’s western provinces with those in the 
east.  The CCP also feared ethnic unrest in these border provinces and the impact such 
unrest might have on economic development and political stability. Thus, throughout the 
history of the PRC, the CCP has emphasized the peaceful development of places like 
Xinjiang and Tibet. To this end, one of the CCP’s most important strategies has been to 
facilitate the migration of Han workers to minority areas in western China.  One effective 
control tactic used was the establishment of the Xinjiang Production Construction Corps.  
This institution, whose primary task was to develop infrastructure in western China, 
provided jobs for primarily Han migrant workers.  According to Millward and Tursun, a 
great deal of Xinjiang’s population growth between 1950 and 1970 was due to 
relocations involving this institution.106   Similar incentives, provided by the state, led to 
Han migration in other areas of China including Ningxia, Qinghai, and Gansu provinces, 
as well as Inner Mongolia.  These policies had a major impact on the demographics of 
minority areas.  For example, today Mongols account for only 14 percent of Inner 
Mongolia’s population.107  Thus, throughout China, Han migration policies have had a 
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profound impact on the ethnic makeup of minority areas; there are currently relatively 
few places where minorities make up a majority of the population.  However, in the case 
of China’s Muslims (as will be analyzed below), migration policies have been perceived 
very differently by Uighurs than they have by Hui. 
 Internal colonialism is often used to describe the social and economic policies 
used by a state to dominate, pacify, and/or assimilate a fringe population into the broader 
interests of the host nation.  The term internal colonialism stems from Michael Hechter’s 
1976 history of England, which led many scholars to apply his model to places like South 
Africa, Thailand, and Bangladesh.108  As the PRC encouraged Han populations to 
migrate to minority areas, it simultaneously enacted sets of economic and social policies 
designed to extract economic wealth while preserving social stability.  In order to control 
these regions, social policies focused on controlling ethnic identity and nationalism.  
These policies were largely successful, as no religious or ethnic-based separatist 
movement has succeeded since the establishment of the PRC.  However, Beijing’s use of 
internal colonialism has resulted in a number of attempts by groups such as the Tibetans 
and the Uighurs.   The following sections will attempt to outline the impacts that these 
migration and colonial policies have made on both the Uighurs and the Hui.  While 
Uighurs have generally rebelled against these perceived attempts at assimilation, the Hui 
have remained more resilient and have primarily reacted by adapting to the new social 
construct, as well as negotiating in order to accommodate the CCP.  Moreover, Beijing’s 
social policies toward the Hui have not been as restrictive as those concerning the 
Uighurs.  This dichotomy of relationships helps to explain the reasons behind Uighur 
separatism and Hui accommodation.   
C. UIGHUR PERCEPTIONS AND REACTIONS TO HAN MIGRATION 
Chinese migration into Xinjiang has had a profound social and economic impact 
on the Uighurs as a whole.  Since 1949, Han presence in Xinjiang has only increased.  
State policies in the 1950s and 1960 resulted in 1.5 million migrants from 1954 to 
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1961.109  According to Nicolas Becquelin, at the beginning of the 1990s, Xinjiang’s Han 
population composed 37.5 percent of the total populace, up from six percent in 1949.110 
Though Uighurs comprised 80 percent of Xinjiang’s population in 1940, in 1990 they 
represented a mere 47.5 percent.111  Xinjiang’s ethnic distribution is divided primarily 
along a north/south divide.  While Uighurs are dominant in the southern half of Xinjiang, 
such as in the Tarim basin, and near the Kashgar area, Han dominate the north, along 
with Kazakhs.112  The results of 40 years of migration were evident during my fieldwork 
in Xinjiang.  In Urumqi, a city that was once dominated by Uighurs, Han Chinese were 
clearly the majority ethnic group.  However, in Kashgar, the opposite was true, as 
Uighurs composed of over 80 percent of the population.   
Many of Xinjiang’s Han migrants came west as a result of the Xinjiang 
Production and Construction Corps, which had 2.1 million members, as of 1990.113  The 
Construction Corps has made a major impact on life in Xinjiang, as its annual revenue of 
$2.05 billion funds many aspects of life in Xinjiang including universities, television 
stations, schools, militias, and prison camps.114  According to deputy commissar Wang 
Guizhen, of the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps, “We’ve made towns and 
cities where there was nothing but a vast wasteland, blank spots on the map.”115  The 
Corps has also yielded economic results, though the majority of Xinjiang’s economic 
assets are under state control.  Beijing’s efforts to develop Xinjiang’s economy have 
focused on two pillars, “one black, one white:” oil and cotton.116  Under Beijing’s 
economic policies, Xinjiang has become China’s top cotton producer, as it currently 
supplies 25 percent of the country’s cotton.117  However, Uighurs have not necessarily 
benefited from the extensive economic development that has been brought to Xinjiang.  
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Of the 2.4 million members of the Construction Corps in 1997, 90 percent of them were 
Han workers.118  Moreover, the unemployment rate among Uighurs in Xinjiang is around 
70 percent, but that of Han Chinese is closer to one percent.119  Uighurs recognize the 
realities embodied by these statistics and as a result, have predictably mixed feelings 
about economic development in Xinjiang. 
Han migration into Xinjiang has made social impacts as well, as Han-Uighur 
relations have faced major complications as Han migrants have increased in number.  As 
increasing numbers of Han Chinese have migrated to Xinjiang, Uighurs have grown 
resentful, despite the economic development that has occurred.  Resentment and unrest 
among Uighurs is widespread and researchers who have spent time in Xinjiang have 
reported evidence of Uighur dissatisfaction with Han migration policy.  Nicolas 
Becquelin reported that in every township he visited in Xinjiang, “Uighur farmers 
complained bitterly about the increased scarcity of water created by the influx of Han 
farmers.”120  In urban areas Uighurs are equally bitter.  During my fieldwork, one of my 
informants –I will call him Omar- explained that since the Han came, finding high-paying 
jobs in urban areas has become more difficult for Uighurs.  These high paying jobs 
include government posts and working for businesses.  However, to get hired requires, 
among other things, an excellent command of Mandarin, a skill which cannot be acquired 
without years of expensive schooling.  Omar informed me that Uighurs in Kashgar feel 
that between increasingly high living expenses, as well as numerous taxes, it is not 
feasible to save enough money to go to college or even senior high school.  This, they 
blame on the Han Chinese.121  In sum, Uighurs are very unhappy with Han migratory 
policies and have expressed their dissatisfaction in a variety of ways. 
Though many Uighurs are simply displeased with the fact that increasing numbers 
of Han have impacted them economically, there is also evidence that increased migration 
                                                 
118 Nicolas Becquelin, “Xinjiang,” 77. 
119 Hasan, 3. 
120 Nicolas Becquelin, “Xinjiang,” 84. 
121 Omar was a Uighur merchant in his 30s, who was divorced and had one child.  I found that many 
Uighurs agreed with virtually everything he told me, but he was my only informant that explicitly 
complained about the influx of Han Chinese.  Many other informants agreed that finding jobs was difficult 
and that living expenses were high.  However, he informed us that many Uighurs feel these problems are 
because of increasing numbers of Han Chinese.  
36 
is related to increased ethnic tension between Uighurs and Han.  Bovingdon recorded that 
he was frequently told that “Uighurs hate Hans, and it’s getting worse all the time.”122 
According to Rudelson, mutual group perceptions have fueled ethnic hostility, but more 
than anything, Han Chinese and Uighurs do not normally associate.123  James Millward’s 
assessment of Xinjiang argued that “interethnic relations between Uighurs and Han in 
Xinjiang are more tense today than they were five or ten years ago.”124  Also, according 
to Millward, the 1990 riots in Baren county were motivated by “Chinese migration into 
Xinjiang and reports that the Chinese government would extend its one-child family 
planning policy to minority nationalities including Uighurs.”125 Thus, based on these 
accounts, it seems that Han migration has contributed to poor interethnic relations in 
Xinjiang, based in part on perceived assimilation.   
D. INTERNAL COLONIALISM, RELIGIOUS POLICY, AND THE 
UIGHURS 
Han migration has created an extremely tense ethnic environment within 
Xinjiang; the addition of perceptions of unfair economic treatment and intense, restrictive 
social policies has led some Uighurs to violent rebellion throughout the past 20 years.   In 
some ways, portions of the Great Western Development Strategy fit the internal 
colonialism model.  For example, the CCP’s approach to extracting Xinjiang’s natural 
resources has been perceived by Uighurs as being exploitive. As was mentioned before, 
Xinjiang’s Tarim basin contains the PRC’s largest oil reserve.  Additionally, Xinjiang 
possesses 115 of the 147 varieties of minerals found in China.  As China has increasingly 
come to rely on these precious resources, Beijing has placed a greater emphasis on 
integrating Xinjiang’s wealth with the broader Chinese economy.126  This integration, 
however, has created a widespread local perception that Beijing is simply exploiting 
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Xinjiang’s natural resources in order to fuel the economies of other Chinese provinces.127  
Xinjiang also supplies China with a great deal of energy.  According to the Xinjiang 
Science and Technology Institute, 79.5 percent of energy resources found in Karamay 
had been extracted in 30 years.128  Xinjiang’s cotton industry has also created perceptions 
of inequality.  According to Colin Mackerras, cotton production in Xinjiang rose from 
294,700 tons in 1989 to 1,477,000 tons in 2002, which made Xinjiang China’s leading 
cotton producer.129   Uighurs, however, do not feel as though they are benefiting from 
these resources, as many perceive a major wealth gap between their own ethnicity and the 
Han Chinese.130  In reality, there is some truth behind these perceptions.  According to 
Calla Wiemer’s study, there is a strong pattern of ethnic economic disparity; Han Chinese 
in Xinjiang tend to live in relatively wealthy places, but Turkic minorities tend to inhabit 
the less developed and relatively poor areas.131  Thus, Uighurs’ perceptions of economic 
inequality, which are true to some extent, may be attributed to Chinese economic 
colonialism. 
 Chinese social policies have also created the perception of inequality and 
unfairness among Uighurs.  In fact, Uighurs often refer to the Han as aka millat (“the big 
brother minzu”) or bu aka (“this big brother”).132  Perhaps one of the most intense 
aspects of Han social colonialism has been the CCP’s treatment of Muslims in Xinjiang.  
According to testimony given by Kahar Barat, the majority of Uighur people have 
forcibly become “separated from Islam133.”  Such separation has not only occurred as a 
result of over thirty years of harsh religious policy, but also because of the CCP’s current 
stance toward Uighur Muslims.  The CCP’s approach to Uighur Muslims has been to 
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make worshipping and following Islam increasingly difficult, especially in response to 
the attacks of September 11, 2001.  First, for the past two decades, Uighur youth under 
the age of 18 have been forbidden from attending mosque.  This has prevented an entire 
generation of Uighurs from publicly practicing Islam and has generated the perception 
that the state wants to separate Uighurs from their religion.  Second, Beijing has 
considerably expanded its definition of “illegal religious activities” to include educating 
children.   This has contributed to the perception that the state does not wish Uighurs to 
be allowed to practice their faith.  Additionally, state discrimination against Muslims in 
Xinjiang is intense.  According to Fuller and Lipman, public sector employees have been 
forbidden from wearing traditional Islamic garments, growing traditional mustaches, and 
attending religious services.134  Further, it is widely known that government informants 
attend mosque services in order to monitor not only content, but also the attendance of 
state employees and other peoples of interest.135   Finally, by expanding the definition of 
“illegal religious activities” (which traditionally only referred to followers of Falun 
Gong) to include aspects of Islam, Beijing has given local officials carte blanche to 
persecute Muslims.136   Such policies have prevented young Uighurs from learning about 
Islam and older, Islamic Uighurs from holding influential jobs.  This intense religious 
persecution has contributed to Uighur feelings of animosity and inequality. 
 China’s reaction to the attacks of September 11, 2001 also created the perception 
that Uighurs are unequal and should be assimilated.  In a speech made in Urumqi, on 1 
September 2001, Wang Lequan, the Secretary of the XUAR Communist Party 
Committee said, “Xinjiang is not a place of terror.  By no means is Xinjiang a place 
where violence and terrorist accidents take place very often.”137  However, in the weeks 
that followed, Beijing launched a set of new policy initiatives that further restricted the 
Uighurs’ ability to practice Islam.  These “new security measures” included closing 
mosques that were considered to be a “bad influence,” scrutinizing Islamic clergy, 
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increasing monitoring of Islamic education programs, and setting new guidelines for 
practicing Islam in Xinjiang.138  Additionally, in southern Xinjiang, security measures 
grew increasingly intense and repressive.  In the months that followed, roving military 
patrols constantly patrolled the streets of Kashgar, checking vehicles and identification 
cards.139  Arrests and detentions have also increased to levels not seen since the “Strike 
Hard” Campaign of the late 1990s.  Amnesty International estimated that between mid-
September 2001 and the end of 2001 at least 3,000 people were arrested for political 
reasons; at least 20 of those were tried and executed.140  In sum, China’s reactions to the 
attacks of 11 September have not helped to defeat Uighur perceptions that assimilation 
and repression are taking place. 
 Generally speaking, Uighurs feel as though the Han Chinese do not belong in 
Xinjiang and that their arrival has brought great a great deal of economic disparity and 
social suffering.  Conversely, Beijing’s approach to its Hui minzu has been much more 
accommodating and this has resulted in far less violence.  The next sections will explore 
the ways in which Han migration and internal colonialism have affected the Hui, as well 
as the ways in which the Hui have reacted to these phenomenon.  Han migration has 
affected the Hui differently, as the minority was spread throughout China as a result of its 
history.  Without a native homeland, many Hui have not responded to Han migration in 
the same way that Uighurs have.  Also, Beijing has not treated the Hui as harshly as it has 
treated the Uighurs and this has resulted in increased levels of accommodation, from both 
sides.   
E. HUI PERCEPTIONS AND REACTIONS TO HAN MIGRATION 
Chinese migration policies have affected Hui regions of the PRC differently than 
Uighur regions, as the Hui are spread throughout every province and nearly every county.  
Ethnic tension as a result of migration has depended on the mutual levels of tolerance 
between Hui and Han inhabitants.  As was mentioned before, resulting tension has not 
been widespread and has been the result of isolated incidents of intolerance.   In some 
places, coexistence between Hui inhabitants and Han migrants has created problems, due 
                                                 




to misunderstanding caused by ignorance.  The instance cited above of Han Chinese 
placing the head of a pig on a mosque demonstrates that the migration of Han Chinese 
into Hui areas has not been entirely without incident.  However, in most parts of China, 
Han migration policies have not resulted in high levels of ethnic tension.    
 Though migration policies have resulted in low levels of ethnic tension, it is 
important to recognize that migrations have affected the Hui in very different ways than 
they have affected the Uighurs.  First, the Hui have no homeland or territory which they 
consider to be “their own.”  It is true that there are regions in China, Ningxia province for 
example, that were predominantly Hui before Chinese migrants began to move west.  
However, because the Hui do not maintain a specific homeland, their perception of Han 
migrants has been very different than that of the Uighurs.  Hui see Han Chinese as an 
annoyance at worst and not as a threat to the survival of their national identity.  
Additionally, while the Uighurs have enjoyed a certain degree of independence from the 
Han Chinese before the establishment of the PRC, the Hui have been in constant day-to-
day interaction with Han Chinese since the introduction of Islam to China, centuries ago.  
Thus, the Hui are more accustomed to interactions with the Han and have not perceived 
Han migration as an intrusion (at least not to the same extent as the Uighurs).  These key 
differences help to explain the reasons for relatively low ethnic tension among Hui and 
Han Chinese. 
F. INTERNAL COLONIALISM, RELIGIOUS POLICY, AND THE HUI 
Just as Han migration has affected the Hui in different ways than it has affected 
China’s Uighurs, economic and social policies have not been perceived by the Hui as 
particularly repressive.  Different perceptions have mostly come as a result of different 
effects of Beijing’s policies at local levels.  China’s approach to economic development 
in the West left Uighurs with feelings of inequality and exploitation; however, in many 
Hui minority areas, this has not been the case.  As a whole, China’s Hui have prospered 
under China’s reformed economic system, as their stereotyped (but in most cases 
genuine) flair for entrepreneurship has led many Hui to capitalize on Beijing’s reforms, 
many of which have affected heavily Hui areas.  For example, in rural Na Homestead, 
located in Ningxia province Hui have embraced the private responsibility system and 
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free-market reforms, which have led to substantial gains in standards of living.141  Under 
the new free market reforms, Hui living in Na Homestead operate 70 percent of the 
restaurants, food stands, and private stalls that have opened in the Yongning County Seat 
market area since the reform.142  This is remarkable, as they only constitute 12.6 of the 
county’s population.  According to Gladney, this economic prosperity among rural Hui as 
a result of state policy has led to the unintended consequence of support for religious 
activity.143  Because many Na villagers believe that their good fortune was the result of 
Allah working through the Chinese government, Beijing’s policy of economic reform in 
Na Homestead seems to have helped revive Islam by encouraging Hui Chinese to attend 
mosque, pay alms, and support the clergy.144  In sum, China’s approach to economic 
development in rural Hui areas has allowed minorities, including Hui to profit.  This in 
turn has prevented violence directed at the government.   
 Beijing’s religious policies have also perceived differently by Hui than they have 
by Uighurs; this difference in perceptions is the result of differences in policy execution 
by local cadres.  Hui Muslims are given a relatively large amount of freedom to practice 
Islam in China, in part because of China’s hope to improve ties with the Middle East.  
According to Dru Gladney, global Islam has become important to local Hui Islam and 
this has impressed upon Beijing the importance Middle Eastern governments place on the 
CCP’s treatment of its Islamic minorities.145  In addition to allowing Hui Muslims some 
degree of genuine autonomy and leniency to practice, the CCP has substantially increased 
the numbers of Hui it has sent abroad to study in the Middle East.  Unfortunately, China’s 
strong ties with the Middle East have not worked out as well for Muslim minorities on 
China’s borders, including the Uighurs.  Despite improving its relations with Muslims in 
China’s interior and urban areas, Beijing has continually increased restrictions on Turkic-
speaking Muslims.  This has led to perceptions of inequality among Uighurs, among 
other minority groups.   
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Cadres in Xinjiang have used religious policy as a way of repressing the Uighurs; 
this has not been the case in Hui areas.  According to Gardner Bovingdon, “religious 
practices permissible among the Hui are forbidden to the Uighurs.  That is to say, 
Muslims in China confront separate and unequal treatment based on region and 
identity.”146  Examples of disparities between the treatment of Uighur and Hui Muslims 
are easy to find.  For instance, throughout the reform period in China, Beijing allowed 
some mosques to be reopened and forced others to remain closed, based on which 
locations preached the “correct” sorts of messages.147  In Hui areas, it is normal for 
minors under 18 to be allowed to attend mosque, but in Uighur areas, as mentioned, 
youth may not attend.  Young Hui are allowed to receive religious education after school 
and in public, but in Xinjiang, there have been reports of Uighurs arrested for the same 
types of activity.  In Hui areas, the number of imams allowed by the state has remained 
constant, but in Uighur areas, this number has fluctuated wildly and in many areas, there 
has been a marked decrease.148  Additionally, according to Kahar Barat, religious 
persecution in Xinjiang targets ethnic groups, not religious offenders.149  Although 
Amnesty International has reported the imprisonment of thousands of Uighurs on 
religious charges, similar reports of large scale arrests involving Hui Chinese have not 
been released.  Thus, Beijing’s religious policies have been executed very differently by 
local cadres; China’s stance toward Islam in Hui areas has not been nearly as repressive 
as its activity in Uighur areas.   
G. CONCLUSIONS 
Beijing’s social and economic policies in the reform era have affected its Muslim 
minorities in very different ways.  In some cases, this has been the result of different 
execution by cadres at local levels.  In other instances, however, this has been due to 
social and/or cultural factors.  In any case, the different effects produced by Beijing’s 
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policies have created very different perceptions of inequality among Uighurs and Hui, 
relative to the Han.  The Uighurs have perceived themselves as victims of Han attempts 
to wipe out their culture through migration and assimilative policies.  The Hui, on the 
other hand, have not perceived Han migration, economic reform, and religious policies as 
attacks on their ethnicity; rather, they have accommodated changes and prospered.  Based 
on the framework provided by the grievances school, these differences in perceptions 
indicate that the Uighurs are more predisposed to engage in separatism than the Hui.  As 
was demonstrated above, this has been the case, as the Uighurs’ responses to the 
aforementioned policies have included direct attacks at state authority.  The Hui, 
however, have not responded in this way.  Therefore, it seems that the grievances school 
provides at least a partial explanation for the reason that Uighurs have engaged in 
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III. THE POLITICS OF MINORITY IDENTITY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Ethnic identity is a difficult concept to define and compare, especially among 
peoples in locations where fieldwork is heavily restricted (such as the PRC).  Research 
restrictions aside, the concept of ethnic identity is different among and even within ethnic 
groups, which can make comparison difficult. Still, through careful analysis, it is possible 
to outline contemporary Hui/Uighur ethnic identity and compare the extent to which each 
facilitates resistance in China.  This chapter will attempt to highlight the differences 
between modern Hui and Uighur identity and the ways in which these differences have 
led to different responses to Han domination in China today.  In sum, this chapter will 
show that because Hui identity is rooted deeply within the PRC, the Hui have been able 
to successfully integrate with the Han majority.  On the other hand, since Uighur identity 
exists independently from the PRC, the integration of the Uighurs into Han culture has 
been largely unsuccessful.  This difference among China’s Muslims has manifested itself 
in Han-Uighur relations through mutual distrust, misperceptions, and in some cases 
violence.  While it is true that Hui interaction with Han communities has also, at times, 
led to violence, such a phenomenon is relatively rare; however, Uighur resistance and 
violence has been much more common.    
B. THE POLITICS OF IDENTITY 
Before addressing the concepts of contemporary Hui and Uighur identity, it is 
first necessary to clarify the notion of ethnic identity in general.  This thesis will use 
Ralph Premdas’s framework for analyzing secessionist movements.  Premdas divided the 
causes of separatism into two different categories: primordial and secondary.150  This 
thesis will use these divisions in society to demonstrate the reasons that the Uighurs 
engage in separatism where the Hui do not.  Though Premdas argued that these 
primordial and secondary factors may all lead to separatism because of the cleavages in 
society they represent, this thesis will argue differently.  This chapter will attempt to 
demonstrate that the unique combination of primordial factors of which Hui identity is 
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composed have prevented the outbreak of a major separatist movement.  Modern Hui 
have successfully integrated Han and Islamic primordial factors, which has led to a fairly 
peaceful Han-Hui relationship.  Moreover, the lack of secondary factors in present Hui 
identity has resulted in a Hui population that is very loyal to the PRC.   Conversely, the 
unsuccessful integration of Uighur primordial factors with Han China has created major 
rift between Uighurs and Han in Xinjiang today.  Additionally, modern Uighur identity is 
also composed of secondary factors, which have created a Uighur population that is not 
as loyal to the PRC as the Hui.  The result of this difference in Han-Hui and Han-Uighur 
relations explains, to a certain degree, the differences in CCP-Hui and CCP-Uighur 
relations and the tendency of Uighurs to use more violence than the Hui.  
 It is also necessary to briefly discuss the realities of ethnic identity as they apply 
to Uighurs and Hui.  There is currently an intense academic debate regarding the 
cohesiveness of the identities of both ethnic groups.  This chapter will not engage in this 
debate and will make generalizations with which some scholars would not be happy.  
Indeed, Uighur identity varies widely and this has led some to question their cohesiveness 
as an ethnicity.  Many Uighurs seem to feel more loyal to their particular oases, but 
others emphasize a national Uighur identity.  Islam is extremely important to some 
Uighurs, but other Uighurs do not believe in Allah.  It is also true that some Uighurs, 
especially those that are wealthy, have assimilated with the Han and this has created a 
certain degree of separation in Uighur identity.  However, completely assimilated 
Uighurs are quite rare in China; it is also unlikely that they are actively engaging in 
separatism.  Thus, this chapter will focus on unassimilated Uighurs, who constitute the 
majority of Xinjiang’s minority population. 
Hui identity is also very complex.  Hui Chinese vary widely in terms of their 
application of Islamic values and traditions and this has made it necessary to draw 
conclusions using a certain degree of generalization.  Despite these inconsistencies, it is 
important to recognize that there is disagreement among people of every culture as to 
which values, traditions, and factors create their identity.  In the United States, for 
example, some citizens feel most loyal to their hometown, while others feel most 
attached to a particular region of the country.  Still others consider themselves simply 
American or in other cases, a blend of American and another culture.  For the purposes of 
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this thesis, I will focus on the primordial factors (race, culture, and ethnicity) which seem 
to be the most evenly shared among the ethnic groups in question.  At certain times, it 
will be necessary to make distinctions and this chapter will do so.  At other times, it will 
be necessary to generalize and I will, to the best of my ability, attempt to underscore 
these instances.   
C. MAPPING CONTEMPORARY HUI IDENTITY: PRIMORDIAL 
FACTORS 
As was mentioned above, contemporary Hui identity is comprised almost entirely 
of primordial factors, defined by Ralph Premdas as long-standing divisions and 
characteristics of society that form the basis for ethnic identity: culture, values, race, and 
religion, for example.151  The Hui do not share many secondary factors, defined as shared 
features or experiences.  Though Premdas argues that it is more difficult for a host 
government to accommodate or reconcile primordial factors, the case of the Hui has 
proved that this is not always the case.  Because modern Hui identity combines the 
primordial factors of their ancestors (Arab-Persian traders) and, to a point, their Han 
Chinese neighbors, the Hui people possess a strong loyalty toward the Chinese state.  In 
other words, without the concept of China, the Hui identity would not exist in its current 
state, as the Hui are both Muslim and Chinese.  This unique identity separates them from 
other Chinese Muslim minorities, including the Uighurs. 
In order to demonstrate the ways in which present Hui identity has discouraged 
separatism, it is first necessary to explore the primordial factors which comprise the 
modern Hui ethnicity: race, values, culture, and religion.  The first of these factors, race, 
is essential to understand if one is to gain a true appreciation for modern Hui identity.  
The Hui race has been portrayed differently by different sources.  For instance, according 
to Dru Gladney, some scholars have cited distinct physical features characteristic of the 
Hui: “hazel-green eyes, long beards, high-bridged noses, and light, even red hair.”152  
Other scholars, however, such as Colin Mackerras, claim that the Hui are virtually 
ethnically indistinguishable from the Han and one must resort to other factors in order to 
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distinguish the two ethnic groups.153  During my own fieldwork in western China and 
Beijing, I often asked both Han and minority people, “What is the difference between 
Han and Hui?  The most common answer to this question, I found, was that the Han and 
Hui are the same except that the Hui believe in Islam and do not eat pork.  This answer 
seems attractive for a number of reasons.  First, the Hui do not have their own language; 
the vast majority of Hui speak Mandarin, while a few others adopt the languages of the 
minority areas in which they live.  Second, China’s Hui live in virtually every major 
region of China and in 97 percent of China’s counties.154  Finally, intermarriage between 
Han and Hui is not entirely uncommon, which, through the centuries, has led to a large 
amount of racial integration between the Han and Hui.155  Thus, from a racial standpoint, 
it is extremely difficult to distinguish the Han from the Hui.  Despite this, however, there 
is one distinction between the Hui and other Chinese on which all parties seem to agree.  
China’s Hui are indeed the direct descendants of the original Arab-Persian traders who 
brought Islam to China.156  Thus, China’s Hui are a racial mixture of Arab-Persian 
heritage and the Han Chinese, with whom the traders married, hundreds of years ago.  
This shared heritage, along with shared culture, values, and religion is one of the 
foundations of modern Hui identity and, because of its inclusion of Han Chinese, has 
helped the integration of the Hui into the modern social structure of the PRC. 
Just as the racial makeup of the Hui demonstrates a blend of Chinese and the 
Islamic peoples of the Middle East, contemporary Hui values and culture also reflect this 
combination.  The Hui have, over the last several centuries, successfully integrated Islam 
with Chinese culture, despite some scholars’ arguments that such a combination is 
impossible.157  To be sure, there is serious academic debate as to the extent to which the 
Hui possess a common, unified culture, but the best demonstration of the Hui ability to 
integrate these cultures is through the Hui idea of qing zhen.  According to the Oxford 
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Chinese Dictionary, the words qing zhen translate to “pure and true,”158 but in the PRC, 
the combination of the two has evolved to mean “Islam.”159  Throughout China, Hui 
Chinese have carried this value of “pure and true” into different aspects of their lives, as 
they have, to differing extents, assimilated into Chinese culture.  For example, according 
to Dru Gladney’s fieldwork, it is very common for Hui Chinese to follow Islam and 
abstain from pork, especially in the northwest and north central regions of China.160  On 
the other hand, in the south, the value of qing zhen has manifested itself in different ways.  
In the southeast, Hui express the value of qing zhen through the “preservation of one’s 
true ancestry and the ability to demonstrate the veracity of that claim,” by honoring the 
ancient Sufi tombs and temples, built by ancestors.161  Thus, the Hui have managed to 
integrate this shared value of a “pure and true” life into the realities of living in modern 
China. 
China’s Hui minority has also successfully integrated other cultural values into its 
identity in order to more effectively preserve their cultural identity.  According to 
Jonathan Lipman, there are three things which all Hui share: “white hats, oil cakes, and 
common blood.” 162  In his book chapter by the same name, Lipman argues that the Hui 
are both Chinese and Muslim.163 That is, despite their constant interaction with non-
Muslims throughout all of China, the Hui have developed customs and habits which have 
allowed them to maintain separate but prosperous lives under the Chinese system.  For 
example, Hui use Arabic script, white caps, halal food, and religious practices in order to 
maintain a successful combination of Chinese and Islamic life.  Though Lipman would 
argue that this integration has been less unified than Gladney’s fieldwork would suggest, 
both men seem agree that present Hui identity is composed of both Chinese and Islamic 
values.    
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Despite the differences between Hui and Han culture, it is important to examine 
the ways in which many Hui Chinese have interacted with their Han neighbors.  Of 
China’s ten Islamic minorities, the Hui seem to be the most assimilated and are certainly 
far more integrated than groups such as the Uighur.164  First, aside from high-
concentration areas of Chinese Muslims, most Hui children attend Han schools.165  
Second, the fact that most Hui speak Mandarin as a first language has helped the ethnic 
group to establish a reputation as very proficient businessmen.  Throughout China, Hui 
merchants have succeeded in establishing prosperous specialty businesses, such as jade 
carving, butchering, and inn-keeping.166  Finally, the Hui’s unique identity as a minority 
people with strong Han roots as allowed them to become a sort of cultural “middle-man” 
between the Han CCP and China’s other minorities.167  This has been accomplished 
through both business and cultural ties; for instance, in Hangzhou, Hui Muslims have set 
up a prosperous silk industry by which they cater especially to China’s Tibetan 
populace.168  Thus, through education and business, the Hui have successfully integrated 
themselves into Chinese society, especially through modern Chinese values such as 
prosperity and commerce. 
Islam is the final primordial factor with which the Hui most identify. However, 
this identification as a Muslim ethnic group has not dramatically hindered the Hui’s 
ability to integrate with the Han Chinese.    Most Hui consider themselves to be Muslim, 
regardless of their actual personal practices.  There are splits and divisions within this 
identification with Islam, but most Hui are Sunni.  Although the Chinese state is officially 
secular and prohibits state employees and students from following any religion, the Hui 
have been able to successfully integrate their culture with modern Chinese society.  For 
example, as was mentioned in Chapter II, there are differences in the ways Uighurs and 
Hui are allowed to practice Islam; these differences reflect the Hui ability to negotiate 
with the CCP.  Currently, according to testimony given by Kahar Barat, Hui Islam “must 
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be subject to socialistic guidelines…[and] is allowed only through officially trained 
imams.”169  It is also important to understand the ways in which Chinese Muslims, such 
as the Hui, have adapted Islam to fit with Chinese culture.  According to Mi Shoujiang 
and You Jia, the Chinese interpretation of Islamic doctrine and beliefs reflects integration 
with Confucian thought, Daoism, and Buddhism.170  For example, because of Islam’s 
teaching that one’s supreme loyalty to Allah ran contrary to Confucian thought, Chinese 
Muslims have adopted the belief that loyalty to Allah, one’s ruler and one’s parents are 
the three true life virtues.171  Other examples of the ways in which the Hui have adapted 
Islam to Chinese culture include festivals, holidays, weddings, funerals, and the 
establishment of the Chinese system of Islamic ethnics.172  In sum, many Hui identify 
very strongly with their Islamic faith; however, Chinese Islam has been integrated into 
the Chinese system and as such, the Hui have been able to remain Islamic and Chinese. 
D.  MAPPING CONTEMPORARY UIGHUR IDENTITY: PRIMORDIAL 
FACTORS 
Uighur identity under the PRC has remained largely independent and this is one 
of the most overlooked causes of violence in Xinjiang.  The Uighurs’ inability to 
integrate their identity with the realities of contemporary China has contributed to semi-
hostile Han-Uighur relations.    This section will examine the ways in which primordial 
factors in Uighur identity have contributed to this unfriendly dynamic.     
 Before discussing the role of the Uighur in China today, it is first useful to 
examine the commonalities among the ethnic group; that is, what is it that makes a 
Uighur a Uighur?  The answer to this question is not as simple as one might think.  In 
fact, the term Uighur has only been used in its current sense since 1935.173  With this in 
mind, there are three main categories into which modern Uighur identity may be 
classified: ethnicity, culture, and religion.  Each of these categories can be further 
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subdivided into a number of different identities, because of internal and external factors.  
A careful examination of these three categories will provide some insight into the true 
nature of modern Uighur identity. 
 Uighur ethnicity seems to be the strongest influence that defines modern Uighur 
identity.  This ethnic identity stems from a number of important identifiers which many 
Uighurs share: language, history, and lineage.  The Uighur ethnic group is comprised of a 
number of smaller, Turkic ethnic groups, lumped together by the CCP because of the 
fluidity of ethnicity and the need for cultural simplification.174  True or not, the majority 
of Uighurs in Xinjiang believe they are direct descendants of the indigenous inhabitants 
of the Tarim basin.175  This belief has created an ethnic identity that is not reliant on the 
PRC or on any other occupying power.  In other words, though the term Uighur may not 
accurately describe all of those labeled as such, the majority of Uighurs in Xinjiang 
appear to view their ethnicity as a major identifying characteristic.176  Other factors have 
increased the rift between Han and Uighur.  For example, Uighurs speak a Turkic-based 
language that most Han cannot understand.  Also, most Uighurs feel an attachment to 
Xinjiang and see the Han as outsiders or occupiers.  Thus, ethnicity acts as a strong 
uniting influence in Xinjiang today.  However, this influence has worked to separate the 
Uighurs from the Han, rather than to help the Uighurs integrate.  
 Though ethnicity is a strong, but divisive factor in modern Uighur identity, one 
must also consider the role of Uighur culture in modern Xinjiang and the ways in which it 
has exacerbated the split between Uighurs and Han.  Modern Uighurs’ distinctive cultural 
identity has served to further separate them from the Han populace, which has 
contributed to deteriorated Uighur-Han relations.  For instance, according to a British 
expatriate, who I will call Ted, cultural differences have contributed to a general attitude 
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of mutual distrust among Uighurs and Han in Kashgar.177  Ted noted that in many ways, 
Chinese and Uighur culture maintain completely opposite values.  For example, Uighurs 
use loud-voices, are very direct, while maintaining piercing eye contact, even with 
strangers.  However, Han Chinese are different.  Chinese are subtle, quiet, indirect, and 
rarely make eye contact.  Uighurs also have their own Turkic language, which is largely 
unintelligible to the Han.  These cultural differences, he said, have made Chinese people 
very uncomfortable with Uighurs, and vice-versa.  Ted’s assertion that Han Chinese are 
uncomfortable with Uighurs was confirmed by many Han Chinese, including an 
informant whom I will call Jialing.178  According to Jialing, Uighurs are thought of as 
hypocritical (because they say they don’t eat pork, drink, or smoke, but actually many 
do), shallow, and not trustworthy.  Han people are very suspicious of becoming friends 
with a Uighur because there is a major belief that despite how close you might think you 
are to a Uighur, “they will betray you if they can.”  These cultural barriers are 
exacerbated by a lack of communication between the two ethnic groups, and prejudices 
such as this seem to perpetuate the cycle.  Both of these interviews demonstrate that there 
is a major cultural gap between the Han and the Uighur, which has contributed to not 
only distrust, but also a barrier to the Uighurs’ ability to integrate into Han society.  Such 
cultural differences do not exist as widely between Han and Hui; therefore, the Han-Hui 
cultural relationship is clearly different than that of the Uighur/Han. 
 Islam is the final primordial factor found in contemporary Uighur identity, and it 
too has contributed to distrustful Han-Uighur relations.  Although the Hui have managed, 
for the most part, to integrate Chinese society into their practice of Islam, this has not 
been the case among Uighurs in Xinjiang.  Rather, Islam has been used by both Uighurs 
and Chinese as a basis for self-isolation and discrimination, as both groups have used 
                                                 
177 This informant, Ted, was an expatriate who had lived in Kashgar since 2001.  A student of the 
Uighur language, he worked in an independently-operated travel agency.  Probably in part due to his 
proficiency in Uighur, Ted seemed to be very informed on topics such as Uighur identity and Uighur 
culture.  Many of his insights either confirmed other scholars’ field research or provided insight on topics 
not yet extensively covered by Uighur experts. 
178 Jialing was a Chinese store clerk, of about 24-26 years old.  She had migrated to Kashgar seeking 
work four months before I met her.  She came from Guangxi province and was therefore very familiar with 
minorities and minority cultures.  She seemed to be well-informed about Uighurs and their cultural 
practices; however, she maintained a number of stereotypes, which I found interesting.  She is a particularly 
intriguing source, as she was obviously well-educated but still believed a number of rumors regarding 
Uighurs which were simply untrue. 
54 
religious grounds for justifying their actions.  As was covered in Chapter II, according to 
Graham Fuller and Jonathan Lipman, the discrimination against Uighurs by Han Chinese 
through religion is severe, and its increase threatens to shape modern Uighur religious 
and ethnic identity.179   For example, in the public sector, Uighur employees are subject 
to strict guidelines, many of which forbid religiously significant clothing (i.e. the doppa 
skullcap for men and the hijab scarf for women).  Beijing’s laws regarding crackdowns 
on “crime” have translated to a crackdown on Islam.180  Islam has, therefore, become a 
way of resisting state power, and religious activity is likely to grow in this role as time 
goes on.181  According to Colin Mackerras’ fieldwork, imams in southern Xinjiang have 
been known to preach anti-Chinese sermons, encouraging violence against the state.182  
More common resistance to state policy through religious means, however, takes place at 
far more fundamental levels as well.  Though the teaching of Islam to children under 18 
is forbidden, it has become increasingly common for Uighurs to teach their children to 
pray in the home, observe religious holidays, such as Ramadan, and follow Muslim 
traditions.  According to Rudelson, the growth of Islamic tradition as the local level is 
significant and it has encouraged a variety of responses to Chinese policy, from violent 
resistance to indifference.183  Such secretive teachings have become a strong symbol of 
identity among Uighurs today and will likely grow in significance as Han migration into 
Xinjiang continues.184   
 Though Islam has contributed to discrimination by the Han against Uighurs in 
Xinjiang, reverse discrimination, by the Uighurs against the Han has also contributed to 
the isolation of the Uighurs as an ethnic group.  In Xinjiang today, Uighurs have, to a 
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certain extent, isolated themselves on the basis of religion and this has strengthened 
Uighur identity.  Such self-isolation has undermined integration between Uighur and 
Han; this lack of integration highlights the difference between Uighur-Han and Hui-Han 
relations.  For example, it is important to recognize that the Hui and the Uighurs do not 
necessarily agree on a wide variety of issues.  Uighurs will not eat in most Hui 
households and will very rarely eat meat sold at Hui butchers, as they do not believe it is 
up to their religious standards.  Neither Hui nor Uighur will eat in a Han household, and 
most Han will not eat in Uighur restaurants.185   The reasons behind these interactions 
have more to do with distrust or misunderstanding than actual hostility; however, the 
social separation of Uighur, Hui, and Han along religious lines is telling.  Other examples 
of this sort of separation abound.  According to every Uighur I interviewed, it is “very 
rare” that a Uighur and a Han could marry.  Since Islam mandates that a Muslim woman 
must marry another Muslim, it is unusual that a Uighur woman will marry a Han, as 
many Han Chinese are not religious.  Moreover, it is equally unlikely for a Uighur man to 
marry a Han woman.  Uighur culture dictates that both sets of parents approve their 
child’s marriage.  According to my informants, it is very unusual for Uighur parents to 
approve a marriage to a Han Chinese, because they feel strongly about maintaining 
Islamic values. 
In some areas of Xinjiang, Hui and Uighur distrust is widespread, especially along 
religious lines.  For instance, though both ethnic groups are Islamic, they pray in separate 
mosques, worship revere separate saints, attend separate Islamic schools, and emphasize 
different Islamic holidays.186  Unfortunately, this distrust has prevented the Hui from 
assuming a role as an intermediary ethnic group in Xinjiang.  In short, mutual fear and 
distrust has spread among all three groups; Many Uighurs do not trust Hui because of 
religious reasons and because Hui speak Mandarin.187  Some Hui believe Uighurs to be a 
“backward” people, but are also marginalized by the Han.  The majority of Han believe 
the Uighur to be strange, backward, and violent.  Some also feel that the Hui are 
dishonest and will support the Uighurs due to religious ties.  Thus, Islam in Xinjiang has 
                                                 
185 Rudelson, 63. 
186 Ibid., 64. 
187 This complicated web of relationships was observed in part during my fieldwork, but is also 
succinctly summarized in Rudelson, 64. 
56 
created a very complex network of misperception and distrust; such a complicated web of 
interactions has effectively isolated the Uighur ethnic group from maintaining peaceful 
relations with the Han. 
 Uighur primordial identity, composed of race, culture, and religion, has not 
facilitated integration with Han Chinese society; rather, it has had the opposite effect.  
While the Hui have largely integrated Chinese values with traditional Islam, the Uighurs 
have not.  This difference has resulted in a wide-spread social cleavage between Uighur 
and Han, which, according to Premdas, is a cause of separatism.  In the sections that 
follow, this thesis will outline the secondary factors found among Hui and Uighur 
identity and the ways in which these have and have not caused separatism among Chinese 
Muslims. 
E.   MAPPING CONTEMPORARY HUI IDENTITY: SECONDARY 
FACTORS 
As demonstrated above, contemporary Hui identity has been strongly shaped by 
the primordial factors of ethnicity, values/culture, and religion; through these factors, the 
Hui have managed to develop an identity which has largely allowed them to assimilate 
into contemporary Chinese society.  In order to fully analyze contemporary Hui identity, 
it is also necessary to investigate the role of secondary factors.  These factors, which were 
also defined in Chapter I, consist of shared experiences and hardships recently endured 
by a population.  Secondary factors, which might include such things as genocide, abuse, 
or forced assimilation, have been cited by Premdas as a cause of separatist and 
secessionist movements.188  This section will argue that the modern Hui identity’s lack of 
secondary factors by the CCP has resulted in a Hui population that feels very loyal to the 
Chinese state and is not poised to engage in separatism.   
As was examined in Chapter II, repression of the Hui by the CCP has been neither 
as intense, nor as widespread as the repression of the Uighurs.  It is also true that such 
oppression and subsequent resistance has been highly localized in China. According to 
Lipman, some Hui communities are more volatile and/or prone to resistance than 
others.189  Chuah argues that this tendency has a great deal to do with the proportion of 
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Hui to Han in a given location.190 In places where Hui tend to be most populous, 
resistance tends to be more likely, but in cities where the Han dominate, resistance is 
nearly nonexistent.  Similarly, antagonistic behavior among Han cadres and Han 
residents varies widely by location as well.   In large part due to the wide variety of ways 
in which the Hui have integrated with the Han, there is a great deal of inconsistency of 
repression, as actions which incite violence tend to stem from lower levels of 
government.  For example, during the 1990s in Shandong province, a riot broke out in 
response to a group of Han Chinese nailing a pig head to a mosque.  This, however, did 
not incite a nation or even province-wide resistance movement.  In any case, there is no 
evidence of a nation-wide identity based on any degree of mutual repression. 
The localization of the Hui also stems from different levels of assimilation; this 
demonstrates that despite some beliefs that “all Hui under heaven are one family,”191 
there is not a prevalent, common attitude of resistance against the CCP.  Though there is 
intense academic debate regarding the cohesiveness of current Hui identity, both sides of 
the debate seem to agree that no general sentiment of resistance against the CCP exists 
among Hui Chinese.192  All sides of the debate also seem to agree that Hui communities 
are extremely diverse and have assimilated into Chinese society in different ways.  In 
some ways, this assimilation has been relatively smooth, with no violence at all.  
However, in other places, such a transition has not occurred smoothly.193  This disparity 
in relations has led to the development of hostile secondary factors in specific Hui 
communities in China, but this attitude has not spread or evolved into a nation-wide 
movement. 
Finally, it is important to recognize that the majority of Hui support the PRC 
despite varying degrees of disapproval toward Beijing’s religious policies.  Without a 
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homeland, like Pakistan or Bangladesh is to Indian Muslims, the Hui can only maintain 
their distinct identity under the PRC in China proper.194  This point is underscored by the 
behavior of overseas Hui.  Unlike Uighurs and Tibetans, Hui living overseas have not 
attempted to set up governments abroad or any sort of resistance group.  The Hui clearly 
feel they maintain a place in the Islamic community, but there has been no strong 
international movement pushing for Hui liberties or independence.  There is also no 
evidence that the Hui support any separatist movement in China, including that of the 
Uighurs.195    Thus, in sum, secondary factors seem to have very little impact on modern 
Hui identity, as shared experiences of the Hui are far too localized and the Hui as a whole 
are far too loyal to the PRC to spark any sort of national Hui movement. 
F.  MAPPING CONTEMPORARY UIGHUR IDENTITY: SECONDARY 
FACTORS 
Though it seems unlikely that contemporary Hui identity has been heavily 
influenced by secondary factors, there is reason to believe that aspects of modern Uighur 
identity have been affected by shared experiences of repression.  While the Hui Chinese 
experience has been the result of policies by a government under which they have always 
lived, the Uighurs’ experience has been different.  From a Uighur point of view, the CCP 
is an occupying entity and, to a certain extent, many Uighurs feel that Xinjiang should be 
at the very least truly autonomous.  It also seems likely that this difference has manifested 
itself, in varying degrees, in a Uighur identity that is hostile to the Chinese presence in 
Xinjiang.  Chapter II covered the repression and grievances of the Uighurs in great detail 
and so this chapter will not reiterate specific policies.  However, it is useful to highlight 
two examples of how the Uighur identity has been influenced by secondary factors.    
First, Chinese religious policy has made a profound impact on Uighur identity.  
Religious Uighurs live in a perpetual state of fear, as Chinese surveillance and restrictions 
have made practicing Islamic risky in the eyes of the average Uighur.196  Uighurs also 
fear the loss of their cultural and religious identity as a result of these policies.  At the 
same time, however, Chinese religious policies have sharpened the influence of Islam in 
southern Xinjiang and have contributed to popular desires to maintain an Islamic way of 
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life.  From non-religious Uighurs’ perspectives, Chinese religious policy has been equally 
important to identity.  Because one must reject Islam and religion in general in order to 
hold government positions in the PRC, ambitious Uighurs have been forced to abandon 
traditional Islamic values.   Thus, there has been a major split in Uighur identity based on 
Chinese policy, and this has had broad implications.  As a result of Chinese religious 
policy, Islam has become more than a religion; in some parts of Xinjiang, it is a symbolic 
means of rejecting the CCP and in turn, Chinese authority.197 
While Chinese religious policy has certainly influenced Uighur tendencies, it is 
also important to examine the implications of the term “Uighur.”  According to my 
British informant in Kashgar, many Uighurs do not feel that the current use of the term 
Uighur is an accurate description of their ethnic group.  Though the term was originally 
introduced in 744, the use of the word Uighur in the PRC was a generalization used to 
lump together a large number of peoples from many different backgrounds.  By grouping 
the majority of the Islamic, Turkic, oasis-dwelling people in Xinjiang together as an 
ethnic group, the CCP effectively drew an ethnic map in which the present-day Uighurs 
already viewed as “their” territory.198  Contemporary Uighur identity has been heavily 
shaped by this grouping,  The fact that the new “Uighurs” constituted the majority ethnic 
group in Xinjiang provided a powerful incentive for accepting the somewhat inaccurate 
term.  This labeling, however, is significant, as many Uighurs still recognize the false 
labeling for what it is: a Chinese-imposed term.  Though the labeling of the Uighurs does 
not necessarily constitute a cause of ethnic violence in China, its roots do reveal the ways 
in which secondary factors have shaped contemporary Uighur identity.  Present-day 
Uighurs recognize the fact that the Chinese are occupiers and are not indigenous to 
Xinjiang, and this constitutes a major difference between the Uighurs and Hui. 
G.   CONCLUSIONS 
Examining the differences between primordial and secondary factors constituting 
Uighur and Hui identities reveal a number of insights which are useful for analyzing 
minority relations in China.  First, the Hui have been far more successful assimilating 
into Chinese society than the Uighur, as their race, culture, and religion have integrated 
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both Chinese and Islamic components.  On the other hand, the Uighurs remain largely 
unassimilated, as their primordial factors have not been compatible with those of the 
Chinese; in fact, attempts at integration have been met with resistance and distrust.  
Secondary factors have not largely shaped contemporary Hui identity, as Hui experiences 
under the CCP have been too localized to constitute any sort of national identity shift.  
The Uighur identity has been profoundly shaped by secondary factors, though, and to 
some extent, this has come at the cost of CCP-Uighur relations.  The underlying reason 
behind this dichotomy of identities is related to each ethnic group’s dependence on the 
PRC as a state entity.  The Hui rely on the PRC as the source of their identity, both 
legally, as well as traditionally.  Hui identity is composed largely of traditional Chinese 
values (such as Mandarin and Confucianism) and the Hui cannot exist as an ethnicity 
outside of China.  The Uighurs are different in that the traditional source of their identity 
is independent from the PRC.   
Though striking, the differences in identity between the Uighur and Hui do not 
represent the causes of specific incidents of violence or separatism in Xinjiang today.  
However, in line with Premdas’ framework, they do illustrate a difference in social 
cleavages, which represent preconditions for separatist movements.  That is, the Uighurs’ 
distinct primordial and secondary identity, which sets them apart from the CCP, has left 
them more susceptible to separatist tendencies than the Hui.  This combined with the 
major differences in socio-economic conditions helps explain the tendency of the Uighurs 
to use separatism where the Hui do not.   
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IV. THE FUTURE OF UIGHUR SEPARATISM AND U.S. POLICY 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Beijing considers the Uighur issue to be an internal matter and as Chapter IV 
demonstrated, the CCP possesses the capability to facilitate ethnic peace in western 
China.  Nevertheless, the United States maintains a variety of interests in China and 
Central Asia; thus, the resolution of the Uighur question is an important security concern.  
This chapter will explore the realities of Uighur violence and the ways in which the 
Global War on Terror (GWOT) has affected not only Uighur separatism, but the Uighur 
population as a whole.  Finally, this chapter will outline U.S. interests in Xinjiang and 
make policy recommendations to facilitate ethnic peace in China.  While the PRC has the 
means to reform and resolve the Uighur issue, the United States’ ability to facilitate 
ethnic peace in China is somewhat limited.   Therefore, the United States should 
approach the Uighur issue by attempting to shape Chinese policy, rather than by directly 
engaging the Uighurs. 
B. UIGHUR SEPARATISM: REALITIES 
Before outlining policy recommendations for the United States toward the Uighur 
issue, it is first vital to take into consideration several realities behind and the future of 
Uighur separatism.  While at times there is a tendency to generalize and classify violence 
by Islamic militants as the result of Islamic fundamentalism, this thesis has attempted to 
argue differently.  This section will attempt to further dispel this myth by providing a 
number of details about the nature of the movement (outlined in Chapter II) itself.  It will 
also draw conclusions regarding the future of violent separatism in western China. 
 One popular myth regarding Islamic militancy in general is that all terrorist 
organizations are driven by Islamic fundamentalism or other religious motives.  Rather, 
Uighur separatists are driven by nationalism and desires for greater autonomy.  
According to Nicolas Becquelin, most Uighurs are not extremists and instead desire the 
ability to maintain their own institutions, preserve their culture, and benefit from Chinese 
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economic reform.199  Though the Chinese government has made numerous accusations 
aimed at portraying Uighur separatists as Islamic fundamentalists, this has not proven to 
be the case.  Aside from a few alleged names of Uighur separatist groups, such as the 
East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM), there is very little evidence that Islam has 
been the driving factor behind Uighur separatism.  Moreover, many Uighur communities 
in exile have set up secular organizations that openly criticize Islamic extremism and its 
role in facilitating violence.200   However, as Chinese religious repression increases, this 
may start to change.  According to Fuller and Lipman, the increased containment of 
religious practices has not quelled Islam as the CCP has hoped; rather, it has strengthened 
the role of Islam in Uighurs’ day-to-day lives.201  As Islam continues to become 
increasingly important to Uighurs, some activists may turn to the radical Islamic 
community for support.  This could turn the Uighur issue into an issue of Islamic 
fundamentalism.  Currently, however, radical Islamic doctrine does not seem to play a 
defining role in the motives behind Uighur violence.  
  Just as Islamic radicalism does not seem to be a major driving factor behind 
Uighur separatism, it is also important to recognize that the roles that external factors do 
and do not play in the separatist movement.  Chinese officials have repeatedly claimed 
that outside actors have provided direct support to Uighur separatists acting in the name 
of an independent Xinjiang.202  According to the PRC’s 2002 report, Hasan Mahsum, the 
leader of the ETIM, sent dozens of terrorists into China, where they set up training 
facilities, and weapons depots.203  Despite these claims, there is little evidence that 
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formal terrorist ties between these groups actually exist. It is true that the United States 
military captured several Uighurs in Afghanistan in the months following the 2001 
invasion.204    However, of the Uighurs captured, four were recently found innocent and 
released; the others are still awaiting their military tribunal.  Despite this, the United 
States designated the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) as a terrorist 
organization with ties to fundamentalist terrorist groups in 2002.  In spite of intense 
pressure from Beijing, the United States has not placed any other known Uighur activist 
group on its terrorist watch list.  Chinese scholars readily acknowledge that regardless of 
Beijing’s rhetoric, Uighur support from Al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations is 
largely insignificant.   They concede that only “dozens” of Uighurs have been trained in 
Afghanistan, despite Beijing’s claims to the contrary.205  Additionally, according to Dr. 
Shang Qianhong of the China Center for Contemporary International Relations, aid 
supplied by terrorist organizations and other external actors are not a huge problem, 
because it is so limited in quantity.206  Thus, direct ties between Uighur groups and 
external actors may exist to a point, but they are largely insignificant. 
 While direct external influences are quite uncommon, indirect forces have had a 
major impact on the Uighur separatist movement.  Such forces vary widely in terms of 
their message, level of organization, and level of support.  However, these factors 
continue to fuel anti-Chinese sentiment throughout Xinjiang and the rest of the world.   
 The first major group of indirect external actors includes nonviolent Uighur exile 
groups throughout Europe, Central Asia, and North America207.  Compared to their 
Tibetan equivalents, these exile groups lack unity and strength, mainly because there is 
no Uighur equivalent of the Dalai Lama.  Without a charismatic central figure around 
which to rally support, the Uighur community has been unable to gain world attention in 
the way that the Tibetans have.  However, Uighur exile groups are numerous and their 
influence in Xinjiang and the rest of the world should not be completely discounted.  
Exile groups’ agendas, rhetoric, and composition vary considerably, depending on the                                                  
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group.  For example, the East Turkestan National Congress (ETNC), based in Europe, is 
primarily focused toward ending China’s occupation of East Turkestan.  According to an 
October 2001 resolution, the ETNC uses appeals to the international community, 
especially the European Union in order to end Chinese repression by opening up a 
diplomatic dialogue with the PRC.208  Nonviolent resistance groups add important 
legitimacy to the Uighur cause and they are important nongovernmental organizations.  
Such groups also perpetuate Uighur resistance by rallying support among foreign 
governments, other NGO’s, and minority communities worldwide.  This type of indirect 
external actor is an important component of Uighur separatism. 
In addition to examining external influences, it is important to recognize the role 
of the internet and its increased importance among Uighur groups today.  “Cyber-
separatism,” as Dru Gladney puts it, is perhaps the most common outlet for expressing 
Uighur grievances.209  Though the internet has many advantages – ease of access, cost-
effectiveness, and less censorship - it also suffers a number of drawbacks, such as the fact 
that information is impossible to verify and can easily be disputed by Chinese officials.  
Cyber-separatism has become increasingly common throughout the last ten years and 
plays an important role for Uighur separatists by disseminating propaganda and raising 
global awareness.  For example, the website http://www.uighur.org contains a great deal 
of information regarding human rights violations, Uighur history, and Uighur-relevant 
news.  These internet websites are maintained by a variety of sponsors, from Uighur 
expatriates to Chinese citizens against propaganda.210   However, it is difficult to evaluate 
the composition of these sites’ audiences, as Beijing maintains careful censorship and 
internet filters.  Though internet access in the United States and Western Europe is 
widespread, cost restrictions have limited the extent to which Central Asians can log-on.  
Therefore, the degree to which these websites are accessed by separatists versus scholars 
and other researchers is unknown.  Despite these shortcomings, globalization has made 
accessing the internet easier than ever and it is reasonable to assume that it will continue 
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to play an important role in the Uighur question.  In sum, internet based groups are a 
significant component of the Uighur separatist movement, however, rather than 
perpetuating separatism, their current role is spreading information about the plight of the 
Uighurs throughout the rest of the world.   
 Finally, it is essential to recognize the realities of Uighur terrorist organizations 
themselves, such that they are.  Although the Chinese government has made numerous 
accusations of the existence of Uighur separatist groups, the evidence surrounding these 
groups’ participation in separatist activity is sketchy at best.  It is extremely difficult to 
find reliable, accurate information regarding specific Uighur separatist groups and many 
sources are provided by the PRC.211  For example, as was noted earlier, the ETIM has 
been accused of receiving weapons, money, and training from Al Qaeda operatives.  
However, according to interviews with Hasan Mahsum, the ETIM possesses no ties with 
transnational terror organizations.212  Additionally Hasan Mahsum has been suspected of 
being a Chinese intelligence agent.213  Despite the accusations, neither China nor the 
United States has ever specifically accused the ETIM of launching any sort of terrorist 
attack.214  Instead, the bombings, rallies, and protests of the 1990s and early 21st century 
have not been blamed on or attributed to specific groups.  Moreover, with only a handful 
of exceptions, no group has ever claimed responsibility for launching terrorist attacks in 
China.  According to Dru Gladney, before the PRC’s 2002 report was issued, very few 
people - including Uighur experts and Uighur activists - had ever heard of the ETIM.215   
Also, the group was not on a report issued by the United States military in 2001.216  
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Finally, it is important to recognize that the United States’ decision to place the ETIM on 
the terror watch list has been criticized as a political decision.  One day before Deputy 
Secretary of State Richard Armitage’s announcement, the PRC said that it would 
implement special restrictions on weapons sales, a measure that the United States had 
pressed for months.217  It has also been argued that the United States placed the ETIM on 
the terror list to strengthen Sino-U.S. relations in the context of the Global War on 
Terror.218  These inconsistencies have led some experts to doubt the ETIM’s role in 
Uighur separatism, despite the United States’ statements.  To be sure, the bombings and 
other violence demonstrate that there are militant groups at work in Xinjiang; however, in 
reality, the Uighur separatist movement does not seem to be as organized or as wide-
reaching as the PRC has portrayed.  Rather, in Millward’s words, “claims regarding the 
existence and activities of Uighur militant groups should be treated with some 
caution.”219 
C. U.S. INTERESTS IN XINJIANG IN THE POST SEPTEMBER 11 PERIOD 
In order to make policy recommendations for the United States regarding the 
Uighur issue, it is first useful to outline U.S. interests in Xinjiang.  As there does not 
seem to be any official, open-source documentation on these interests, this thesis will 
seek to predict several broad objectives and interests which are consistent with recent 
U.S. foreign policy.220  Globally, the United States has four major interests with regard to 
Xinjiang:  political stability of both the PRC and Xinjiang, minimal Uighur-transnational 
terrorist ties, a positive U.S. image throughout the Muslim world, and improved human 
rights. 
 While each of the four aforementioned interests is important to U.S. and regional 
security, the political stability of the PRC and especially Xinjiang is the most critical.  
Currently, the United States and the PRC maintain very strong financial ties, which have 
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produced a high degree of economic interdependence.  The PRC is also an ally on several 
regional issues, such as the North Korean nuclear problem.  It is true that the Uighur issue 
probably does not pose a direct threat to regime survival in the PRC.  However, if other 
factors were involved – such as a banking crisis, social unrest, or a war over the Taiwan 
Strait- the CCP might not be able to survive.  If the CCP collapsed, the PRC could 
fragment or the CCP might be replaced with a regime hostile to the United States.  In 
either case, the result could easily be more dangerous than the current status quo.  Thus, 
political stability and regime survival in China are critical to the current regional security 
outlook and it is in the United States’ interest to maintain this stability. 
 Just as political stability in the PRC is consistent with U.S. interests, a stable 
Xinjiang is vital to Central Asian security.  Xinjiang is home to over 30 different ethnic 
groups, many of whom maintain irredentist populations in neighboring states such as 
Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan.  If Uighur violence increased in magnitude, it is 
conceivable that a large-scale separatist movement could erupt.  A major crisis, along 
with resulting ethnic violence could have spillover effects into other Central Asian states.  
Such effects are consistent with the region’s history; in the mid-1990s the Tajik civil war 
spread rapidly throughout Central Asia because of ethnic ties.  This led to a major 
regional crisis and has severely hindered the economic development of Central Asia.  
Though the United States does not share extremely close economic ties with Central 
Asia, a major regional crisis involving ethnic violence could lead to state failures, 
producing havens for terrorist activity.  Thus, political stability in Xinjiang, along with 
Central Asian regional security, is in the interest of the United States. 
 Though political and regional stability reflect broad interests in the region, there 
are also more acute U.S. interests.  For example, although there is currently little or no 
evidence (from open-sources) of Uighur separatist-Al Qaeda ties, there is reason to 
believe that this could change.  As Islam becomes increasingly important to Uighurs and 
as more Uighurs take their practices underground, Islam may continue to become a 
means of expressing anti-Chinese sentiment.  If this happens, the Uighur issue could 
quickly become religiously charged, leading to extremism.  Uighur extremists could seek 
larger amounts of assistance from groups abroad, including Al Qaeda.  Because the 
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United States does not wish for the global reach of transnational terrorist groups to 
increase, it is in the United States’ interest to minimize Uighur-terror ties.   
 Related to minimizing Uighur ties with transnational terror groups, it is in the 
United States’ interest to promote and maintain a positive image throughout the Muslim 
world.  While conducting my fieldwork, I was surprised to discover that Chinese 
Muslims - Uighur and Hui alike - consider themselves to be important members of the 
Islamic umma, despite the fact that they do not live in the Middle East.  Traditionally, 
Uighurs have been known to maintain pro-U.S. sentiments when compared to Muslims in 
other parts of the world.  However, because of the U.S. war in Iraq and Washington’s 
apparent endorsement of Beijing’s post-September 11 crackdowns, this collective 
mindset is beginning to change.  During field work in Kashgar, a group of young Uighur 
men once asked me what country I was from.  When I replied that I was from the United 
States, one of the men made a violent gesture, while the others laughed.  During other 
encounters, I was asked why Washington disliked Muslims and Uighurs.  Though I never 
experienced outright hostility and/or threats from Uighurs, these encounters made me 
wary and I was careful about with whom I shared my nationality.  If the United States 
hopes to accomplish its military and security objectives in the Muslim world (such as 
maintaining forward bases from which to fight terrorism), it must maintain a pro-U.S. 
image in order to maintain legitimacy. Clearly, maintaining Muslim friends and allies 
throughout the world is in the interest of the United States. 
 Finally, it is important to mention the U.S. interest of promoting human rights 
throughout the world.  Traditionally, the United States has used rhetoric emphasizing 
human rights all over the world, including Asia.  For example, the United States has 
maintained a close relationship with the Dalai Lama, despite protests from Beijing.  As 
this thesis has attempted to demonstrate, improved human rights could help to reduce 
violence throughout western China.  Thus, promoting human rights is not only a 
cornerstone of United States foreign policy; it is also in the United States’ interest to 
improve human rights in Xinjiang. 
D. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES 
Although the Uighur issue is ultimately one that must be reconciled by Beijing, 
the reasons above demonstrate that the United States has an interest in its resolution.  
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Certainly, there is little that the United States can do in order to directly prevent further 
violence in Xinjiang.  However, the United States can influence the PRC to change its 
policy toward its Uighurs.  Though recent levels of violence have not been as high as 
those in the mid-1990s, this does not necessarily reflect Chinese success at cracking 
down on its Uighurs. Rather, it may indicate that Uighur separatism and resistance has 
been driven underground and may once again flare up. By taking steps aimed at resolving 
the Uighur issue, the United States also has the opportunity to improve its image 
throughout the Muslim world.  The following recommendations may help the United 
States to steer the PRC toward ethnic peace in Xinjiang:  engage the PRC on human 
rights, but from a different angle; acknowledge the difference between transnational 
terrorists and repressed Muslims; and continue helping Uighurs exonerated from 
Guantanamo Bay.   
 First, the United States should continue to engage Beijing on human rights issues, 
emphasizing religious and social freedoms not only for Han Chinese, but also minorities 
in general.  Over the past few years, the United States has repeatedly praised the PRC for 
“standing side-by-side” in the current war on terror.221  This rhetoric implies that 
Washington supports China’s recent crackdowns on Uighurs in western China, which has 
undermined the U.S. image among Uighurs and other Muslims.  Furthermore, by placing 
the ETIM on the terror watch list, the United States has linked Uighur violence to the 
GWOT, further emphasizing the legitimacy of Beijing’s approach to Uighurs.  Thus, 
rather than praising the PRC’s continued cooperation, the United States should press 
Beijing on human rights.  There is a logical case (as this thesis has attempted to 
demonstrate) that reduced freedoms and poor ethnic accommodation fuel ethnic tension 
and violence.  Washington should show Beijing that by repressing the Uighur 
community, the CCP is not solving their minority problems.  Rather, current policy is 
exacerbating the situation and could lead to intensified violence.  Maintaining ethnic 
peace among China’s Muslims and fighting the GWOT are not conflicting interests.  On 
the contrary, facilitating an improved relationship between the Uighur community and 
Beijing will prevent violence, extremism, and instability from dominating the region.  
Washington should help Beijing to see this. 
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 Second, in order to not only pacify western China, but also to improve its image 
throughout the Muslim world, the United States should publicly acknowledge the 
difference between globally-based Islamic extremists and Muslim peoples pushing for 
increased autonomy and social freedoms.  In its haste to engage terrorists abroad with 
widespread world support, the United States has endorsed carte blanche repression in 
states with Muslim minorities.  Instead, Washington should publicly recognize that 
although groups like Uighur separatists, Chechen rebels, and Palestinian militants 
occasionally use violence, their objectives are constrained by local political interests.  For 
example, many Uighurs do not want an independent East Turkistan; rather, they simply 
want an increased degree of autonomy and improved social rights.  By themselves, they 
do not pose a direct threat to United States national security. However, if the United 
States continues to lump these minorities into the broader Global War on Terror, it could 
result in a self-fulfilling prophecy.  That is, feeling abandoned by the world community, 
these groups could attempt to expand their objectives and interests by seeking ties with 
transnational terror organizations like Al Qaeda.  It is imperative that the United States 
deter such eventualities and in order to do this, Washington must differentiate between 
politically-based and ideologically-based Islamic movements. 
 Finally, the United States should continue to facilitate the safe return of Uighurs 
from Guantanamo Bay, exonerated of illegal combatant charges, to countries providing 
asylum.  For example, during the summer of 2006, Washington spearheaded negotiations 
with Albania which resulted in the transfer of four Uighur prisoners to refugee camps 
outside of Tirana.  This effort prevented the Uighurs from being returned to China, where 
they would have likely faced execution.  Although China protested the transfer, 
protecting these four Uighurs sends a powerful message to Uighur exiles and to the 
broader Islamic world: you are not abandoned.  There are still a number of Uighurs in 
Guantanamo Bay awaiting trials; if they are also found to be innocent, the United States 
should continue to facilitate their movement to safe havens throughout the world.  If no 
state is willing to accept them, the United States should grant asylum in order to protect 
their rights.  Although Beijing will certainly protest this course of action, the world 
community will most likely stand by the United States, especially if Washington follows 
the aforementioned recommendations.  By continuing to demonstrate that the Uighurs are 
71 
important to the United States, Washington will both improve its image in the Muslim 
world and improve its relationship with the Uighurs as a whole. 
E. CONCLUSIONS 
Although it is very difficult to predict the future of Uighur separatism, it is 
important to understand the realities behind it, especially in the context of the Global War 
on Terror.  Beijing’s post September 11, 2001 stance toward its Uighur population has 
been one of increased repression, which has appeared to quell the violence in the short 
term.  However, it is a mistake to believe that repression is a permanent solution; rather, 
it is likely that resistance has merely been driven further underground.  Thus, it is 
possible that the situation in Xinjiang may become more violent in the long term as a 
result of PRC repression.  The United States has several interests in the region including 
the political stability of China, the restriction of transnational terror ties, a positive U.S. 
world image, and improved human rights.   Although future violence cannot be easily 
prevented through direct U.S. action, there are a number of measures that can be taken.  
In summary, China needs to find ethnic peace nearly as much as the United States needs 
Islamic allies. The Uighur problem gives Washington the opportunity to, as the Chinese 
would say, “yi jian shuang diao” - shoot two birds (regional stability and an Islamic ally) 
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